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About emBRACE 
The primary aim of the emBRACE project is to build resilience to disasters amongst 
communities in Europe. To achieve this, it is vital to merge research knowledge, 
networking and practices as a prerequisite for more coherent scientific approaches. 
This we will do in the most collaborative way possible. 
 
Specific Objectives 
 Identify the key dimensions of resilience across a range of disciplines and 
domains 
 Develop indicators and indicator systems to measure resilience concerning 
natural disaster events 
 Model societal resilience through simulation experiments 
 Provide a general conceptual framework of resilience, tested and grounded in 
cross-cultural contexts 
 Build networks and share knowledge across a range of stakeholders 
 Tailor communication products and project outputs and outcomes effectively 
to multiple collaborators, stakeholders and user groups 
 
The emBRACE Methodology  
The emBRACE project is methodologically rich and draws on partner expertise 
across the research methods spectrum. It will apply these methods across scales 
from the very local to the European.  
emBRACE is structured around 9 Work Packages. WP1 will be a systematic 
evaluation of literature on resilience in the context of natural hazards and disasters. 
WP2 will develop a conceptual framework. WP3 comprises a disaster data review 
and needs assessment. WP4 will model societal resilience. WP5 will contextualise 
resilience using a series of Case studies (floods, heat waves, earthquakes and alpine 
hazards) across Europe (Czech Republic, Germany, Italy, Poland, Switzerland, 
Turkey and UK). WP6 will refine the framework: bridging theory, methods and 
practice. WP7 will exchange knowledge amongst a range of stakeholders. WP8 
Policy and practice communication outputs to improve resilience-building in 
European societies. 
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2. Executive summary 
As one of 5 case studies into community resilience undertaken as part of the emBRACE project 
across Europe, this study was carried out with the participation and assistance of members of a 
complex amalgamation of geographical, interest and practice communities situated along the 
catchment of the River Derwent in the county of Cumbria, north England.  
In terms of meeting the principal emBRACE aim of ‘Building resilience to disasters amongst 
communities in Europe’, this case study offered particular value, because it presented an 
opportunity to investigate the concept as it is operationalised across a range of hydrologically-
linked topographical and social contexts i.e. from hill farms in the Lake District fells to the post-
industrial port town of Workington that lies at the mouth of the river.  The focus of the research 
was on understanding community resilience to hi-magnitude floods, because parts of this 
catchment have experienced at least two such events since 2005. 
Including data from >65 interviews a series of workshops and observations at community events 
the study met a series of aims related to understanding and developing indicators for community 
resilience at two important scales (sub-county and catchment). 
In respect to the first aim, the research confirmed a complex mix of resource and capacity 
sets that comprise the core of community disaster resilience and identified that, while civil 
protection dimensions remain key facilitators, they cannot effect fully resilient outcomes 
unless developed in concert with the broader social protection objectives and alongside a 
cohort of engaged community members.  
The complexity of the relationships between the emBRACE-relevant domains of 
resources/capacities, actions and learning was evident, as the lens passed down the 
catchment from the Fells to the sea and perfectly illustrated the difficulty in 
compartmentalising ‘Community Resilience’ as any simple, uniform component of a 
population’s makeup: the even greater complexity of the cross-context indicator sets 
proposed is a demonstration of this. Some key attributes did emerge, however.  For 
example, the social network maps can be used to illustrate very effectively the complex 
lateral bonding and bridging nature of key individuals’ social networks at community level, 
but they also reveal how effective some of these people are at linking hierarchically (often on 
first-name terms) into power relationships.  The potential role of people like this in facilitating 
concerted community engagement with risk mitigation and resilience building should not be 
underestimated or devalued.  However, the evidence also shows that this engagement can 
come at considerable personal cost to these people, especially if they have been directly 
hazard affected themselves.  Furthermore, if so much of a community’s resilience is based 
on one or a small number of individuals does this not also point to a vulnerability, or at least 
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a lack of redundancy, at its heart that the presence of strong, accountable, institutional 
services and support (‘social protection’ broadly understood) should go some way to 
alleviate? 
In relation to the second aim, to build trust in FRM bureaucratic processes and civil 
protection procedures at a catchment scale, which inevitably encompasses a range of 
communities with varying access to resources and capacities, requires a dynamic 
appreciation of balance and social equity.  Without this there is a risk that isolated and 
vulnerable communities will be left to spectate as those with louder voices, greater savvy 
and more political linkage receive more investment (e.g. financial, emotional, temporal), 
simply because they are more able to manipulate the ‘rules of the game’ in their own favour.  
Such challenges lie at the heart of the social equity concerns that underpin the Sustainable 
Livelihoods Approach.   
Austerity and the intense competition for the financial resources in the UK Government’s 
Flood Risk Management (FRM) budget provided a backdrop against which many smaller 
communities were being encouraged to do what they could for themselves.  Even large 
physical schemes in England now need a community contribution, but this case study 
describes how one such scheme has come to fruition.  This was achieved through the 
concerted efforts of the town’s Flood Action Group, the local authority and other flood-
management agencies.  The fact that physical defence structures formed such a focus of 
attention cannot, however, be ignored from a resilience perspective.  This is because we 
should all be cognisant of the conclusive critique in the literature regarding the tendency of 
structural measures to increase rather than to reduce flood risk.  In terms of resilience in the 
Derwent catchment, however, it remained the presence or lack of engineered solutions that 
went furthest toward underpinning people’s psychological ability to manage the risks to 
which they remain exposed: 
“I don’t know at which point you get to that … point of saying ‘actually we have bent out of shape 
so much that there is no more elasticity; we have to change things’.  And that’s not the same as 
returning to a normality.  What we’re talking about is there is fundamental transformation and I 
don’t think we’re there yet with flooding in Cumbria, because it’s easier to build, to do the King 
Canute thing of trying to hold things back, rather than move great chunks of [our towns].” 
Interviewee: C47_M_1 
What these investigations also revealed quite clearly was that resilience, as it is defined by 
the IPCC (2014) is powerfully represented along this catchment.  It has, however, been won 
over a period of years through the experience of repeated (flood) events.  It has also been 
won at higher cost to those directly impacted by those events than to those who have not 
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been.  There is clear evidence of the capacity exhibited by the catchment’s social, economic, 
and environmental systems to cope with a high magnitude flood event as well as with other 
disturbances.  They have also responded to and reorganised themselves in ways that 
maintain their essential function, identity, and structure and they have adapted and learned, 
while also perhaps maintaining a capacity for transformation that may only truly be 
operationalised once some future tipping point is crossed.  Whether the next high-magnitude 
flood to strike pushes one or more of the communities studied here over that remaining 
threshold remains difficult to assess.   
This report has corroborated the understanding that, even in the close spatial confines of a 
short river catchment, different geographical communities need to access and utilise 
different resource sets and capacities to maintain their resilience to hazards.  However, it 
has also identified that engaged Communities of Resilience Practice (CoRP) offer significant 
potential in working collaboratively toward disaster-risk reduction outcomes at these 
catchment scales.  A challenge is also offered, however, in the way that CoRP’s have been 
identified as requiring a truly inclusive remit.  This involves formal agencies understanding 
and supporting each other’s roles, in deliberating and delivering a full range of capacity-
building civil- and social-protection solutions that reflect sustainable, equitable and 
achievable outcomes at every point along the Integrated Emergency Management spectrum 
(i.e. not just preparedness and response) and for all communities they serve.     
In completion of the final aim, the set of qualitatively-determined indicators proposed in this 
report offers Communities of Resilience Practice potentially useful metrics with which to 
measure the resilience of their hazard-exposed population over time, but also a means 
through which to illustrate to each other the complex range of community attributes that they 
each, and therefore by association, they all need to nurture if their risk reduction mandate is 
to be achieved. 
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3. Introduction  
This emBRACE case study was carried out with the participation and assistance of members of a 
complex amalgamation of geographical, interest and practice communities situated along the 
catchment of the River Derwent in the county of Cumbria, north England.  
In terms of meeting the principal emBRACE aim of ‘Building resilience to disasters amongst 
communities in Europe’, this case study offered particular value, because it presented an 
opportunity to investigate the concept as it is operationalised across a range of hydrologically-
linked topographical and social contexts i.e. from hill farms in the Lake District fells to the post-
industrial port town of Workington that lies at the mouth of the river.  The focus of the research 
was on understanding community resilience to hi-magnitude floods, because parts of this 
catchment have experienced at least two such events since 2005.  The sample was ‘snowballed’ 
from within the multi-stakeholder ‘community of resilience practice’ that has emerged in the 
county as a result of the population’s exposure these flood events, but also their experience of a 
wider range of emergency events that have also occurred since 2000; including a foot and mouth 
disease outbreak and a mass shooting.          
3.1 Overall Research Aims  
The stimulus for the emBRACE research in the north of England was to explore the relative 
contributions to the building of community disaster resilience of civil protection interventions, 
community engagement and broader social protection services and provision.   
The framing of the problem as community disaster resilience pushes attention towards a 
primary reliance upon civil protection interventions (i.e. ‘blue-light’ emergency response). 
However, in line with disaster research that considers root causes of disaster vulnerability to 
lie in structures and practices at some distance from disaster events (Wisner et al., 2004), 
the research was formulated to explore this wider framework in a European context.  The 
task was also to develop a set of indicators across the range of resilience domains in order 
that some approach to measuring this community attribute could be undertaken.  This part of 
the research was guided by Norris et al.’s (2008) proposal that resilience should be 
understood to encompass multiple factors across Economic Development, Social Capital, 
Information and Communication, and Community Competence domains.  Cutter et al.’s 
(2010) development of indicators that required publicly accessible national-scale data for 
analysis (with their inherent limitations), was also useful because this study sought to 
develop indicators that could be utilised at higher than county or municipality resolutions to 
provide civil and social protection service practitioners with a comparative image of 
resilience within these particularly important local-governance scales.  
The overall aims of this emBRACE case-study were to explore community resilience in 
relation to its ability to mobilise different resource-sets and to identify the social dynamics at 
play, which can foster or conflict with this process.  For this reason, and with some 
justification provided by Norris et al.’s proposed domains, this case-study adopted a 
Sustainable Livelihoods Approach (SLA) (Chambers and Conway, 1991a) to its analysis.  
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This is because the human, socio-political, physical, place-based and financial 
categorisation of resources used in SLA, along with its concerns for livelihoods’ sustainability 
and equity and for peoples’ capability to maintain those livelihoods are regarded as fitting 
comfortably within the resilience frame (DFID, 2011).  Taking this Sustainable Livelihoods 
approach, this investigation contained the following three broad research aims:  
 
1. To identify the resource sets required by a community to build resilience toward flood 
events and the capacities required to mobilise these resources. 
2. To assess how social factors such as trust, accountability, cooperation, power and 
influence interact to influence the mobilisation of resources. 
3. To devise indicators for components of the resource sets, action phases (mitigation, 
etc.) and social learning dimensions, which are at the heart of the emBRACE general 
framework. 
 
4. Context of the case study  
4.1 Hazards considered, reference events, general impacts 
(experienced or anticipated) 
The population of Cumbria has experienced considerable adversity in the face of a range of 
hazards and threats1 during the last 13 years.  For example, the county was at the forefront 
of the Foot and Mouth disease crisis in 2001, which decimated local cattle herds and sheep 
flocks over a wide area as well as severely impacting the wider community and tourist 
industry (Convery et al., 2008).  Further, in June 2010 local resident, Derrick Bird, murdered 
twelve people and injured a further eleven in a shooting spree (Chesterton, 2011). The 
county, has also, however, experienced repeated high-magnitude floods over this period, 
which have caused damage and disruption across the county and generated much press 
attention across the UK.  All these events are still raw in the memory of residents and 
emergency services’ staff, but whilst the wider experience of tragic events provides 
important context for any investigation of resilience in the county, this case-study focused 
primarily on understanding the relationship between the studied communities and flood 
hazards.      
The floods that occurred in January 2005 and November 2009 are the most recent examples 
of extreme flooding in Cumbria.  Several towns, villages and rural areas were affected in 
2005, with Carlisle experiencing ~3,500 homes flooded and considerable disruption to 
                                               
1
 In UK Civil protection terminology hazards include ‘natural events’ (e.g. floods) and major accidents, 
whilst threats relate to human actions undertaken with malicious intent. (HM Government, 2012) 
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energy and communications infrastructure (Cumbria County Council, 2005).  The 2009 
floods are the focus of this research.  This event caused significant damage across Cumbria, 
but most notably along the Derwent River Catchment, as it flows off its headwaters in 
Borrowdale and St John in the Vale, through the towns of Keswick and Cockermouth and to 
Workington and the sea. During this event a nationally unprecedented amount of rain fell on 
a saturated ground (e.g. 314mm fell at one gauging station within a 24 hour period: Cumbria 
County Council, 2011: p. 8).  This caused local rivers to burst their banks and surface water 
to overwhelm drainage systems.  The high rainfall combined with shallow soils and steep hill 
slopes meant that the rain water ran off the land quickly resulting in flash, surface-water and 
fluvial flooding, which reached unprecedented levels as rivers burst their banks. This rapid 
rise of water levels was also exacerbated in parts of the catchment by poor drainage and 
near the coast, by tidal locking (Cumbria County Council, 2011: p.8).    
The 2009 floods resulted in ~2,239 properties being flooded across Cumbria: 80% 
residential; 20% retail and commercial; and many schools were forced to close (Cumbria 
Intelligence Observatory, 2010: p.25-26). Severe travel disruption also occurred on roads 
and railways, with several bridges collapsing or needing to be closed for safety reasons.  
The collapse of the Northside Bridge in Workington resulted in the death of Police Constable 
Bill Barker.  Power supplies and telecommunications were interrupted in some areas 
(including contact with the emergency services). Cockermouth was the worst affected town, 
where the depths of floodwaters reached ~2.5 metres and affected 80 per cent of 
businesses (Riding, 2011: p.1). It was estimated that the 2009 flood event in Cockermouth 
was a 1: 550 year event (Environment Agency, 2011).  Over 800 properties were affected in 
Cockermouth compared to 300 in Keswick and 60 in Workington (Environment Agency, 
2009: p. 6).  Cumbria County Council reported damages to businesses concentrated in 
Cockermouth, Workington and Keswick at approximately £100 million (NERC, 2011: p.4)  
4.2 Socio-economic-demographic context 
Cumbria is located in the northwest of England and is the second largest English county, 
covering an area of approximately 2,600 square miles with a population just under 500,000. 
The county is divided into six local authority districts and boroughs. Cumbria contains all the 
mountains in England over 3000 feet and is widely regarded for its landscape value 
(Cumbria County Council, 2011a) and Areas of Outstanding Natural Beauty (AONB) (Figure 
4.1).  The landscape of lakes and mountains make it a popular tourist destination, and over 
the course of a year over 20 million tourists visit the county.  
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Despite Cumbria’s long-term gradual growth in population, it remains one of the most 
sparsely populated counties in England (Cumbria County Council, 2011b).  Cumbria has an 
ageing population with an influx of middle-aged and older people, with this influx taking place 
in parallel to an out-migration of young people in search of education, employment and 
social opportunity (Cumbria Rural Forum, 2010).  Long-term projections suggest that these 
trends will increase, and by 2029 it is estimated that just over twenty nine per cent of the 
population will be over the retirement age, compared with twenty two per cent for England 
and Wales (Ibid.).  This demographic trend also highlights a disparity between districts, with 
rural areas experiencing the most significant ageing-population effects.  The employment 
structure of Cumbria differs from that of other regions and England as a whole, with a 
reliance on agriculture, hospitality and manufacturing and a low representation of finance, 
business services and education (Cumbria County Council, 2009). 
 
Figure 4.1:  The River Derwent Catchment, situated in Cumbria North West England – note the 
locations of Keswick, Cockermouth and Workington (Environment Agency, 2009) 
Life expectancy for Cumbrian males is the same as the England average (seventy eight 
years) and is one year below the English average for females (eighty one years) (Health 
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Protection Agency, 2012). On average two people live in each household in Cumbria with 
thirty one per cent of households without access to a private car, which may be reflective of 
the ageing population and/or deprivation.    Although tourism in Cumbria provides jobs and 
wealth for many in the county, the region faces economic challenges that could impact the 
regional economy.  These have arisen from a range of problems such as the 2001 Foot and 
Mouth Disease outbreak, competition from low-cost airlines and global tourism, the decline 
of traditional manufacturing industries, steelworks, mining and the on-going 
decommissioning of the Sellafield nuclear site (Cumbria County Council, 2009). 
This case study focuses on the specific urban towns of Cockermouth, Keswick, Workington 
and surrounding rural village and farming communities, which were amongst the worst 
affected areas of the 2009 floods.  
Cockermouth is located at the confluence of the River Derwent and the River Cocker, from 
which its name derives (see map Appx 5.2).  The main street of Cockermouth, which is the 
town’s main centre, hosts an array of largely independent businesses and shops.  Much of 
the town’s architecture is of Georgian and Victorian style (classic late 17th and 18th century 
terraced housing) made of traditional slate and stone.  The town also has a series of small 
alleyways and lanes (often maintaining medieval street patterns) to the rear leading down to 
the River Cocker. The town of Keswick is situated within the Lake District National Park and 
lies on the River Greta and the adjacent Derwent River. The town is a popular tourist 
destination due to its hub location within the surrounding conservation areas (see map Appx 
5.3.  Workington is a post-industrial town at the mouth of the River Derwent.  It is bounded to 
the west by the Solway Firth, part of the Irish Sea (see map Appx 5.1).   
Cockermouth and Keswick represent more affluent towns, whilst Workington’s population 
has the highest proportion of workers undertaking manual labour2.  There are high levels of 
deprivation and high proportion of social housing in Workington (Cumbria County Council, 
2011).  Unlike Keswick, Cockermouth and Workington do not lie directly within the Lake 
District National Park, but Workington’s situation furthest from the park boundary means that 
this town draws the least economic benefit of the three from the National Park’s status.   
Rural villages in Cumbria have a long agricultural history and this remains a key source of 
revenue for many Cumbrian farmers. However, direct employment in Cumbrian agriculture 
and supply-chain industries accounts for only around 3.1% of employment, generating £150 
                                               
2
 Cumbrian County Council Urban Area Profiles cites 22 per cent of Workington residents undertaking manual labour, in 
comparison to 11 per cent for managerial/technical; 6 per cent for skilled occupations and 2 per cent for professional 
occupations (figures based on Office for National Statistics, Information and Intelligence, 1999). 
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million in Gross Value Added in 2006, down from £235 million in 1996 (Cumbria County 
Council, 2009).  The rural economy faces challenges from land management reform and 
increasing focus on the sustainability of rural communities (Ibid.). Traditional farming 
practices have come under scrutiny in more recent years and farmers are now expected to 
take part in more sustainable farm and land management practices. Many farms cannot rely 
solely on agriculture and are having to diversify into other areas, such as tourism and 
hospitality. Other key challenges faced by the rural population include: deprivation, poor 
access to services, education, housing and unemployment (Cumbria Rural Forum 2010) as 
well as the ageing population.   
This case study included rural areas and villages within and around the Derwent catchment, 
including Borrowdale, St. John in the Vale, Low Lorton and Braithwaite.  
The village of Braithwaite is two miles west of Keswick and lies within the boundaries of the 
Lake District National Park (see map Appx 5.4).  Braithwaite has a population of about 1,185 
in 665 households although around 18% of properties in the parish receive 50% discount on 
council tax (suggesting that they are holiday homes). Braithwaite is situated on the Coledale 
Beck and adjacent to Newlands Beck, which merge north of the village and flow into 
Bassenthwaite Lake. 
The village of Low Lorton lies on the River Cocker five miles south of Cockermouth and 8 
miles west of Workington and sits within the Lake District National Park (see map Appx 5.5). 
Low Lorton and the adjacent High Lorton, combined, have a population of about 250 
(Cumbria County Council, 2011). 
The Borrowdale valley lies three miles south of Keswick and sits within the Lake District 
National Park. Much of its land belongs to the National Trust (29,173 acres), including 11 
farms and a Parish population of 438.   Historically farming was the main industry but it has 
become increasingly popular as a tourist destination.  The River Derwent rises in Borrowdale 
before it passes through Derwent Water and on west to Workington. 
 
St John's in the Vale is a glacial valley also in the National Park that lies four miles from 
Keswick.  St Johns Beck, which is the principal outflow of Thirlmere Reservoir runs 
northward along the vale before joining the River Greta and flowing through Keswick. 
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4.3 Context – UK Civil Protection and Flood-Risk Management 
(FRM) Policy 
This case study investigated the respect roles of UK Civil Protection (CP) approaches to 
flood-incident management and the wider flood-risk management and how they influence the 
resilience to flood hazards at community resolutions.  Accordingly, it is important to provide 
an overview of civil protection legislation in relation to flooding, particularly as considerable 
changes have been affected in this practice in response to a number of nationally significant 
flood events that have occurred over the past decade. 
4.3.1 National policy context 
Since 2004 UK Civil Protection (CP) has been regulated under the Civil Contingencies Act 
2004 (CCA).  This legislation defines what the term ‘emergency’3 means and places 
statutory duties upon formal agencies, which it labels as Category 1 and Category 2 
responders4, and it lays out what these responders must do in order to comply with the 
legislation.  The principle duties placed on responders are: risk assessment; business 
continuity management (BCM); emergency planning, and; maintaining public awareness and 
arrangements to warn, inform and advise the public about emergencies (HM Government, 
2012).  This clarification of roles has been referred to as an enabling of the Resilience 
Agenda, proposed by Granatt and Macintosh (2001), which conceptualised resilience in CP 
as being able “at every relevant level to detect, prevent, and, if necessary, to handle and 
recover from disruptive challenges” (Cabinet Office, 2003). These resilience-focussed duties 
were to be delivered through an Integrated Emergency Management (IEM)5 approach that 
centres on the Local Resilience Forum (LRF); a collective of responders who meet regularly 
and during emergencies to coordinate and monitor risks and responsibilities at the scale of a 
police area (i.e. usually county scale in England).   
                                               
3 CCA (2004) defines an emergency as: “An event or situation which threatens serious damage to human 
welfare in a place in the UK. An event or situation which threatens serious damage to the environment of a 
place in the UK. War, or terrorism, which threatens serious damage to security of the UK.” (CCA, 2004) 
4
 Cat 1 Responders are the main organisations involved in most emergencies at a local level (e.g. emergency 
services (Police, Fire & Rescue etc.) along with health sector and local authority partners).  Cat 2 responders 
are those organisations involved in some emergencies (e.g. utilities and transport companies) (HM 
Government, 2012: p.7)   
5 The six phases of IEM: Anticipation, Assessment, Prevention, Preparation, Response, Recovery Management 
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In England the Department for Food and Rural Affairs (Defra) bears responsibility as Lead 
Government Department (LGD) for managing flood response, with the Department for 
Communities and Local Government (DCLG) acting as LGD for flood recovery (Defra, 
2013a).   The Environment Agency (a Cat 1 Responder) bears primary responsibility for 
managing main-river6 and coastal flooding with, since the inception of the Flood and Water 
Management Act (FWMA) in 2010, Local Authorities, acting as Lead Local Flood Authorities 
(LLFA). LLFAs bear statutory strategic responsibility for investigating, reporting and 
coordinating the management of flood risks related to ordinary watercourses, ground and 
surface water.  The Environment Agency (EA), however, retains strategic overview for all 
types of flooding; wherein the EA aims “to support partners’ response where it can” (Defra, 
2013b: p.17).         
Initial assessments of the CCA established its effect on UK CP practice as a formalisation of 
largely pre-existing civil contingencies arrangements that had been in place for many years 
(Walker and Broderick, 2006), with the FWMA seeking to remove some of the fragmentation 
specific to the water sector that had been criticised so strongly following the 2007 flooding 
(Pitt, 2008).  In effect, the legislation could be regarded in familiar top-down terms, but with 
responders now focussed on delivering their emergency (i.e. in this case, flood) related 
duties through the systemised multi-agency LRF approach.  High-level outputs related to this 
approach have included the development of a framework related specifically to flood incident 
management and rescue coordination that structures and integrates the respective roles of 
all formal responders during a flood emergency (Defra, 2013b).    
Engaging the wider population with CP and Flood Risk Management (FRM), which had been 
carried out mainly through the duty to warn and inform (NSCWIP, 2007), rather than in terms 
of a comprehensive engagement strategy has, however, evolved since 2004.  Over the last 
decade English FRM policy, led by Defra’s ‘Making Space for Water’ strategy (Defra, 2005), 
has come to represent a clear example of ‘the privatisation of risk’ (Steinführer and Kuhlicke, 
2009), wherein there is an increasing downward pushing of responsibility for managing flood 
risk from governments right down through to individual households (Watson et al., 2009).  
What this down-shifting has facilitated appears to be the integration of a much wider range of 
stakeholders (e.g. businesses and grass-roots community groups) into the whole IEM and 
                                               
6
 In England main rivers are designated by Defra, with the Environment Agency's powers to carry out flood 
defence works applying to these rivers and flow-regulating structures thereon only. Every other open 
watercourse in England and Wales is determined by statute as an 'ordinary watercourse' 
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FRM process.  Such ‘responsibilization’ (Kuhlicke and Steinführer, 2010) of communities and 
individuals is further evidenced by a shift in the funding arrangements for flood and coastal 
management that occurred in 2011.   
From this date the funding criteria for flood defence schemes (i.e. largely physical defence 
structures) changed from a national system based on priority scoring across all proposed 
schemes in the country (i.e. with the highest scoring schemes receiving funds) (EA, 2008) to 
a system whereby scheme stakeholders were encouraged into a process of partnership 
funding, where Defra offered to contribute toward a scheme, on the understanding that a 
proportion of the total budget would be met by contributions from the non-government 
sources (Defra, 2011a).  Whilst the idea was developed in order that “more schemes are 
likely to go ahead than under the previous ‘all or nothing’ funding system”, a House of 
Commons committee revealed in 2013 that only limited funds had been attracted from other 
sources, most of which came from local authorities who were already “facing their own 
funding challenges” (EFRA, 2013).  The implication being that even the low levels of top-up 
funding evidenced were only being provided by local authorities at considerable opportunity 
cost to their other priorities.  As LGD for flooding, Defra has, however, also strived to engage 
communities directly with their flood risks, with the flood management strategy published in 
2011, entitled ‘Understanding the risks, empowering communities, building resilience’ (Defra, 
2011b), which encourages a full range of stakeholders to participate in risk management 
activities as well as supporting the creation of Flood Action Groups.  Defra has also funded a 
range of non-structural FRM projects, including research into the efficacy of property-level 
protection (PLP) (Harries, 2009, Merrett, 2012).   
4.3.2 Refocus on ‘Community Resilience’ 
Following the wide-area flooding across the UK in 2007 the resilience focus in UK CP and 
FRM shifted slightly in terms of flood emergencies specifically, when Sir Michael Pitt, in his 
review of the response to those events recognised that: 
Many communities showed themselves willing to pull together. Helping neighbours 
became second nature, and we have heard many stories of community spirit and 
engagement. So we strongly endorse the announcements in the National Security 
Strategy relating to the promotion of Community Resilience by government in 
partnership with local organisations. (Pitt, 2008: xxxiv - emphasis added) 
This aspiration for community resilience to become a substantive CP outcome was adopted 
as a national framework of non-statutory guidance in 2011 (Cabinet Office, 2011).  Within 
this document, however, community resilience was defined as a community attribute that 
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focussed on their capacity to harness “local resources and expertise to help themselves in 
an emergency, in a way that complements the response of the emergency services” 
(Ibid, p.11: emphasis added).  Although limited in its focus, this understanding of community 
resilience as a supplement to the formal response came at a time when flood emergencies 
were continuing to plague the UK and the emergence of an increasing number of grass-roots 
Flood Action Groups (FAG).  What was obvious with this emergence, however, was that 
instead of considering themselves as community ‘responders’, these FAGs were taking on 
activities that reflected all aspects of the IEM approach, with local advocacy for flood-risk 
mitigation (i.e. flood prevention measures) forming as important a part of their community-
protective activities as were developing protocols for (e.g.) delivering neighbourhood door-
knock warnings. Further enabling the expanded and in many respects ‘political’ emergence 
of FAGs as local advocacy groups has been the influence of the National Flood Forum, a 3rd 
sector organisation which has become a crucial link between policy and hazard exposed 
communities (e.g. the NFF directly assists communities in setting up FAGs, it commissions 
research and advocates for communities at government level: Harries, 2010, NFF, 2014)     
4.3.3 Local context – Flood Action Groups and the Community Emergency 
10-Step Plan 
Following the severe impacts of flooding in 2005 a number of Flood Action Groups formed in 
the affected towns across Cumbria (often with initial assistance from the NFF).  In the River 
Derwent catchment the two main FAGs represented the flood affected towns of Keswick and 
Cockermouth.  In Cockermouth the group’s activities were mainly focussed on achieving 
greater protection for the Goat area of the town, which was flooded again prior to the 2009 
event’s impact on the much larger town area.  Both these groups engaged with the formal 
responder and FRM agencies and developed close working relationships that assisted in 
laying the foundations for major structural defence schemes, as well as in developing grass-
roots response management capabilities.  Keswick FAG, particularly, developed 
contingencies that actually supplemented the actions of the formal agencies during the 
response phase, rather than simply ‘complementing’ them.  For example, the fact that KFAG 
had installed a dedicated telephone line into the town hall for emergencies the day before 
the flood, enabled a lot of the coordination to be carried out from that building, with 
community members and responder staff working together.  
 The KFAG Community Emergency Plan (CEP) is now even more sophisticated and 
encompasses numerous specific actions to be coordinated and taken chronologically by 
community volunteers, from the initial broadcast of a severe-weather warning, through the 
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monitoring of river-level thresholds, to the point where volunteers need to retreat from flood-
affected areas before they are inundated. 
 In addition to the FAGS in the towns the 2009 event stimulated local 3rd sector organisations 
Cumbria Council for Voluntary Services (CCVS) and ACTion for Communities in Cumbria to 
begin to work more closely with the Cumbria Resilience Forum (henceforth, the LRF) to 
deliver a community-level emergency planning framework.  This workstream was financed 
through several avenues, including through national funding organisations such as the Big 
Lottery as well as the locally-based Cumbria Community Foundation (CCF) and other 
charitable funds.  What emerged was a process through which predominantly rural 
populations, some of whom had suffered significant disruption during the floods, could 
develop their own Community Emergency Plan (CEP).  This process became known as the 
Ten-Step plan (Table 4.1 shows the ten-steps of the planning process) (ACT, 2012).  
 
Step Action 
1 Getting Together 
2 Organising the work 
3 Knowing the Unknowns 
4 Identifying Skills and Resources 
5 Resolving legal disputes 
6 Organising key facilities 
7 Keeping in touch 
8 Activating your Emergency plan 
9 Taking Control 
10 Testing your plans 
Table 4.1: The Community Emergency Planning – 10-
Step Route Map (ACT, 2012) 
 
The underlying ethos for the encouragement of emergency planning by rural communities 
reflected the fact that during the flooding , many local communities did not receive 
assistance from the formal responder agencies for many hours: 
 “…it wasn’t my problem; my task was to manage the [particular urban area].  Obviously 
globally, you know Gold Command was set up; there was a Strategic Coordinating 
Centre, but my experience of the [rural valleys] etc. is that they were all there to fend for 
themselves.” C13_M_1 
This problem, where communities found themselves without support was not, however, 
restricted to the rural areas: 
15 
 
 “We phoned for sandbags didn’t we? And my reply was ‘Oh they’ve all gone to [the other 
town] because its flooding you know’ and I said ‘Yes and so is [our town] and they couldn’t 
answer me.” C27_M_3-3 
Due to the fact that so many communities had found themselves dealing with events 
unprepared, the LRF supported the 10-step plan in a concerted effort to engage 
communities with the planning process.  This has resulted in increasing numbers of groups 
being formed: 
 “…that was something that the [Cumbria Resilience Forum] whole-heartedly supported 
and said, I remember we spent a whole afternoon on it, the work that [ACT] did was first 
class in my view, in terms of tapping into local people, providing them with the tool kit.  
Because I think that’s often the problem, people speak about business continuity and 
emergency plans and things and it sort of scares people off, they think it has to be some 
kind of fancy, formal technical product and it doesn’t.  It’s just very simple.” C10_M_1 
Organisation of these rural groups can be undertaken as a workstream by Parish Councils, 
whose formal status offers connection to a ready structure through which professional civil-
protection partners (e.g. ACT, EA) can channel advice and support.  So whereas the 
Keswick and Cockermouth groups formed independently as grass-roots groups, with the 
approval and assistance of the parish, town, district and county councils, but separate from 
them, the 10-step groups have had much more facilitation from the LRF members, especially 
the EA, and ACT.  In rural areas this was not, however, a straightforward case of the 
councils readily extending from their usual responsibilities: 
“I remember the Chairman of the Parish Council saying ‘I haven’t got a clue what this is all 
about, we haven’t got any money, we haven’t funds, we haven’t got any resources’ and all the 
rest of it. But now basically what they have been told to do is start planning” C61_M_1   
If groups emerge that are not naturally affiliated to a parish council, then encouragement has 
always been given by the LRF partners for them to seek formal constitution.  Constitution 
opens up wider opportunities for funding to be directed to groups who present a compelling 
case for financial assistance in developing risk-mitigation solutions (e.g. to assist in funding 
the installation of Property-Level Protection (PLP) in certain properties). 
 “…the fact that you’ve got a group that’s come together to deliver something, that you’ve 
checked that they are properly constituted, or if not you’ve pointed them in that direction, 
you then make sure they’ve got a bank account, they’ve got processes in there, then 
they are a group that’s going to carry on.” C24_M_1  
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The Ten-step plan is also promoted by the local authority through its legal requirement as 
Lead Local Flood Authority (LLFA) to conduct local meetings to discuss FRM with exposed 
or flooded communities: 
 “…And then as part of that we’re able, through the 10-Step Plan, to say to communities 
‘well have you thought about your own personal household resilience, not just flooding 
but other issues as well?’  […] that’s why the [Resilience Forum] supported developing 
the 10-Step Plan; it’s something that we’ve always wanted to achieve and it was just 
helpful that ACT had the funding that they had from the Lottery to be able to put in that 
final push to get it through.” Hi-Level interviewee C24 
This participatory 10-step planning process has included a number of workshops, organised 
collaboratively by the 3rd Sector and Responder partners, where mixed delegations of 
professionals and community members work together to learn about emergency planning, to 
showcase existing plans, to validate plans and to encourage and facilitate the development 
of greater planning uptake.  
5. Methodological approaches  
This case study was conducted using a mixed methodology, which included interviews, 
workshops and social network analysis.  The fieldwork was conducted over the period of 
approximately one year, between July 2013 and July 2014, with the research being carried 
out by a team of UoN staff.  Sixty-five interviews were completed using a snowball sampling 
method (section 5.3).     
5.1 Defining ‘Community’ 
A principal concern across the project, which was enunciated within the first deliverable 
(Birkmann et al., 2012) was the importance of understanding which ‘community’ was actually 
being referred to in any reference to community resilience, i.e. there is a need to define the 
‘resilience of what?’ question (Carpenter et al., 2001).  What was laid out in that deliverable 
was a simple typology of community types, which could be used to distinguish any particular 
social grouping under investigation.  These types were, communities of: geography; interest; 
circumstance; supporters/practice and; identity. 
In developing the research method that would underpin this case-study research it was 
realised that in looking at a population spread along the full length of a river catchment, it 
was likely that multiple types of community would be revealed.  This was indeed the case.  
However, the ‘snowballing’ sample selection criteria undertaken in this study (section 5.3) 
did point toward one specific community type over the others; the community of 
support/practice.  However, this could be more usefully defined.  In a civil-protection context, 
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communities of support are understood as being those communities “within organisations 
that provide emergency response services” (Cabinet Office, 2011: p.12).  In this instance, 
the Local Resilience Forum (see section 3.3) could be regarded as such a community.  
However, communities of practice have been defined much more inclusively, not only in 
terms that better encompass integrated emergency management (i.e. not just in terms of 
‘response services’ alone) but also in terms of stakeholder inclusivity.  Communities of 
practice are understood as: 
“…groups of people who share a concern, a set of problems, or a passion about a topic, and who 
deepen their knowledge and expertise in this area by interacting on an on-going basis” (Wenger 
et al., 2002: p.4)       
Treating the wider LRF/FRM network in Cumbria as a practice community enabled the team 
to ‘snowball’ perspectives from the full range of actors involved in flood management along 
the Derwent.  However, the method also created opportunities to reach out beyond these 
often closely networked contacts, into the wider community of circumstance where weaker 
ties connected ‘practitioners’ to flood-affected people whom they knew also had insights to 
reveal.  
In addition to being guided by the concept of community of practice, the role of social 
networks in disaster response and other resilience-relevant activities is well documented 
(Aldrich and Meyer, 2014, Cordasco, 2006, Dynes, 2005a).  Accordingly, the research used 
a social-capital lens to investigate whether, and if so how, resilience thinking was 
propagating through the community of practice and out into the geographical communities 
along the Derwent catchment.  Particular interest was taken in identifying the respective 
roles of bonding (within tight family or interest groups); bridging (laterally through weaker ties 
to other community-based networks) and linking (hierarchically, in order to draw or to project 
political/power-based influence into practice-based activities).    
5.2 Applying the emBRACE Framework 
In applying a range of different predominantly qualitative methods it was important to retain a 
focus on developing a methodology that would complement any analysis structured around 
the emBRACE framework (Fig. 5.1) and the consortium-preferred definition of resilience 
(IPCC, 2014)7.  
                                               
7 emBRACE preferred resilience definition: “The capacity of social, economic, and environmental 
systems to cope with a hazardous event or trend or disturbance, responding or reorganizing in ways 
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Figure 5.1: The emBRACE Community Resilience Framework 
 
This case study’s main focus was on developing qualitative understandings of interactions 
across all three framework domains (resources/capacities, actions and learning), but this 
investigation was always intended to explore the flood-affected communities’ differential 
access to resources and capacities.  This focus was guided by the Sustainable Livelihoods 
Approach (SLA) (Chambers and Conway, 1991b) and supported by the re-adoption/adaption 
of the SL approach by the Department for International Development (DFID, 2011). 
                                                                                                                                                  
that maintain their essential function, identity, and structure, while also maintaining the capacity for 
adaptation, learning, and transformation” (IPCC, 2014, emphasis added). 
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Considering resources and capacities from an SLA perspective, involves categorising them, 
typically, in terms of human, social, natural, technological/physical and financial/economic 
capital.  However, we also agree with Tobin’s (1999) suggestion that to understand 
resilience across any scale of society, there is an imperative to also explore the undeniably 
social concept of the ‘Political’ (and the ‘political’).  Table 5.1 details how resources and 
capacities have been categorized in relation to this case-study, with the political explicitly 
integrated into the social, as an acknowledgement that it is within the negotiation and power 
play that forms the key component of social relations that the clearest manifestation of the 
political occurs.                    
Human 
Resources and 
Capacities 
Health (physical and mental), work, knowledge, skills, education, self-
esteem and wellbeing. These are fundamental resources for anybody 
and without which it is difficult to make use of the other resource sets.  
Socio-Political 
Resources 
Family, friends and informal networks; more formal membership of 
groups; trust relationships that assist in collective action and 
knowledge-sharing.  Obviously associated with social resources, 
political resources are manifest in the power and capacity to influence 
political decision-making (through formal and informal participation in 
and/or access to political processes); hazard management legislation 
and standards. 
Financial 
Resources 
Earned income, pensions, savings, credit facilities, benefits, access to 
insurance. 
Natural/Place-
based (Wilding, 
2011) 
Protecting and developing ecosystem services (in this context 
especially those that offer degrees of flood protection such as an 
operable floodplain, appropriate flood defences); land, water, forests 
and fisheries (for direct exploitation as well as more indirectly for 
personal wellbeing etc.); cultural/heritage resources; local public 
services, amenities, and access to jobs and markets (the availability of 
access rather than having employment which is covered by human 
resources).  In-situ (legacy) housing, roads, water and sanitation 
systems, transport, communications and other infrastructure 
Physical 
Resources 
Structures, tools, equipment and premises related specifically to the 
‘work’ of hazard mitigation. 
Table 5.1: Resource sets for sustainable livelihoods (after:  Chambers and Conway, 1991) 
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Acknowledging the multi-scaled influences of socio-political capital is vital in this context, 
because rather than just to assume that ‘resilience’ to hazards can be achieved simply  (i.e. 
if we were only to do the right thing with the resources at hand), the inclusion of the political 
into our framework necessitates, as already implied, an appreciation of distributional effects 
and the potential for social in/equity, i.e. whether those equity concerns are founded in the 
dynamics of, e.g. deprivation, gender or a rural-urban divide .  Linked too with this concern 
over equity are the two other conceptual metrics of this approach, capability and 
sustainability.  Capability here is considered “as being able to cope with stress and shocks 
and to make use of livelihood opportunities” and sustainability as the “ability to maintain and 
improve livelihoods whilst maintaining or enhancing the local and global assets and 
capabilities on which livelihoods depend (Ibid. p.5.).  Adapting the original SLA 
categorisation, this report also proposes that the concept of ‘natural’ resources, which imply 
an element of the pristine (i.e. untainted by human hand) should be couched in more realistic 
terms.  We adopt the idea of Wilding (2011) by considering geographical context in terms of 
‘place-based’ resources.  Such definition allows for the acknowledgement that the 
environment at risk of flood bears a physical legacy of alteration and management that has 
put in place countless structures, services and systems that are irremovable from any 
consideration of landscape.  Placing such community assets as buildings and infrastructure 
into this category also allows for the conceptual understanding of ‘physical resources’ to be 
focussed on accounting those assets that perform specific work in relation to flood risk 
management (e.g. bunds, flood walls, Property-Level Protection (PLP) devices and flood-
warning systems). 
Whilst the emBRACE framework (Fig. 5.1) has value as a heuristic for explaining community 
resilience, the dynamic interactions across the component domains (resources/capacities, 
actions and learning), present a seeming knot of complexity that confounds simple 
explanation.  Many of the observations presented in section 6 could clearly bear 
interpretation across two or even all three domains, but for the sake of reporting and in 
assisting the development of structured conclusions, having a single predominant 
categorisation is useful. Accordingly, key points of relevance that emerge in section 6 are 
then summarised and tabulated in section 7, relative primarily to their association with the 
resources/capacities domain, secondarily to actions and in tertiary to learning.  As Twigg has 
previously pointed out in relation to community resilience:     
“Without a structure of this kind it would be impossible to find one’s way through the many 
diverse characteristics of resilience. But, like all frameworks, this imposes somewhat artificial 
distinctions between different aspects of the subject. There is actually much more connection 
and overlap, and many individual Characteristics of a Disaster-Resilient Community could 
appear under more than one Thematic Area or Component of Resilience.  There is a danger 
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– as there is with any framework – that one will over-separate the different elements and 
overlook the linkages between them. These connections across the different themes and 
components must be kept in mind.” Twigg (2009: 13)   
5.3 Sampling strategy 
One of the most interesting features of the Cumbria flood experience, which made the case-
study so attractive to research, was the fact that Derwent-catchment based Flood Action 
Groups had been at the vanguard of the locally-affected population’s attempts to better 
manage their flood risks.  An important factor in sample selection was that members of the 
case-study team had already developed research relationships with key informants within 
the affected local population (e.g. flood-affected residents and their ‘supporters’ from various 
formal institutions).  These relationships had evolved since initial contacts were made in the 
months directly after the 2009 flood event, with several of these key-informants, for example, 
having taken part in a workshop organized by the Lancaster University team that had 
conducted award-winning ESRC and Environment Agency funded research on flood 
recovery in Hull, UK, following the devastating flood there in 20078 (Whittle et al., 2010).  
These pre-existing relationships meant that there existed an element of trust between the 
research team and these informants in relation to how they expressed their own stories.  
However, it also meant that they were prepared to act as facilitators for the team, by offering 
names and opportunities through which to engage a wider sample of participants into the 
project.  In effect this represented a ‘snowball sampling’ strategy (Robson, 2005), which 
ultimately led to the identification of 65 respondents.  Collaborations with local stakeholders 
also opened up the opportunity to use community  links that had been developed by a local 
3rd sector organisation in a separate catchment (Ullswater) to run a discrete community 
resilience workshop.  This event, which was jointly delivered by UoN and WSL, became the 
emBRACE 1st stakeholder workshop, which was fully reported in emBRACE report D6.3. 
5.4 Interviews 
A total of 65 people were interviewed for the project along the length of the catchment, with 
participants either being interviewed on a one-to-one basis, in pairs or in small groups (with 
a maximum number of 4 previously-acquainted individuals).  Interviewees represented a 
range of interests, from directly flood-affected individuals from either rural or town locations, 
to representatives of high-level governance institutions within the county (e.g. Cumbria 
County Council) and local 3rd sector service-delivery organisations.  Table 5.2 illustrates the 
spread of interviewees between the locations and institutions wherein the individuals have 
                                               
8 http://www.lancaster.ac.uk/lec/sites/cswm/Hull%20Floods%20Project/HFP_home.php  
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been attributed a single domain.  However, due to the nature of the research and the 
predominant ‘snow-balling’ recruitment method employed, several of these individuals were 
able to provide insights from more than one perspective (e.g. several interviewees 
categorized under ‘hi-level institutions’ actually lived in a study town or area and regarded 
themselves as directly or indirectly flood affected.  Accordingly, these individuals were able 
to legitimately provide direct first-hand accounts of their personal flood-related experiences 
as well as describing their professional perspective). All interviews were recorded and the 
recordings transferred at the earliest opportunity to the UoN secure hard-drive for later 
analysis.  The interviews were semi-structured in format (Oppenheim, 2004), with the 
interviewer being guided by a set of question topics (Appx. 1) 
 
Domain/location Interview participants 
Hi-level institutions 25 
Rural 6 
Keswick 13 
Cockermouth 10 
Workington 11 
 65 
Table 5.2: Interviewees by location 
 
In respect to the ethical considerations of anonymity and informed consent, all interviewees 
and other participants were asked to read and sign a consent form prior to participating in 
any formal research activity from which data was directly recorded (i.e. interviews and team-
facilitated group meetings). All original interviews were then fully transcribed and 
anonymized prior to analysis using Nvivo™ Qualitative Data Analysis software.  In order to 
incorporate selective quotations into outputs, the anonymisation was carried out by way of 
allocating a coded unique reference number (URN) to each interviewee.  This URN was 
broken down by participant number, gender and community-related affiliation (Table 5.3), 
e.g. the first interviewee was female and worked for a county-scale 3rd sector organisation, 
hence she is identified by the URN C01_F_3-1.   Where the selected quotations are drawn 
from interviews and take the form of question and answer, they have been labelled Q for 
Question and P for participant (if more than one participant was being interviewed at the 
same time responses are denoted P1, P2 etc.)  
The separate Social Network Mapping (SNM) tasks required the analyst to work with original 
transcripts in order to prevent any confusion that could occur between the use of actual 
names or attributed pseudonyms.  For security, these original transcripts were analysed by a 
UoN team member through the UoN password-protected secure hard drive.  All original 
23 
 
names were then removed from the SNM spreadsheet prior to delivery to SEI team 
members who used dedicated software to create the network maps.  For these tasks a 
slightly modified URN categorization was required, due to the inclusion of the additional 
networked contacts that were identified through this analysis (see section 5.7).  All original 
recordings and transcripts will be destroyed at the conclusion of the project, leaving only 
anonymized resources for re-analysis.   
  
Participant no. C00  
Gender M/F  
Institution 1 Governance - 
Nat/County scale 
 2 Governance - 
District scale 
 3-1 3rd Sect - County 
 3-2 3rd Sect - District 
 3-3 3rd Sect - FAG 
 3-4 Faith-based 
 4 Community 
member 
Table 5.3: Interviewee coding regime 
 
5.5 Workshops 
5.5.1 Data providers: preliminary D3.2 Disaster Footprints workshop 
In order to assist project partners in the development of emBRACE Del 3.2 Disaster 
Footprints and maps report, a small workshop was held in Carlisle.  This event was focused 
on identifying the types of data that could be available in the development of a Community 
Disaster Resilience Assessment (CDRA).  Accordingly, the delegation comprised data-
management specialists from several Local Authority departments and partner agencies.  
5.5.2 Ullswater Community Resilience: D6.3 Stakeholder workshop 
Working in collaboration with ACTion for Communities in Cumbria (ACT), an influential local 
3rd sector organisation, the project team took the opportunity of running the project’s 1st 
Stakeholder Workshop9 in Patterdale, beside Ullswater.  Whilst this location (and its 
population) falls outside the case-study’s principal fieldwork area (i.e. the Derwent 
                                               
9
 Project milestone (MS) 24 
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catchment), the event was useful because it provided an opportunity for the team to directly 
assist ACT and the Lake District National Park Authority (LDNPA) in further developing a 
strand of work they had started in the area related to climate change adaptation (McCormick 
and Harrison, 2013).  The report that resulted from this workshop (Del 6.3) has been 
adopted by the LDNPA and is now linked from its website10.      
5.6 Observations at community events 
Team members also attended a total of 7 Community-Resilience focused events at different 
venues in Cumbria.  These events were run by Environment Agency, County Council staff or 
by 3rd-sector or community groups and offered the opportunity for the researchers to observe 
the interaction between community members and the formal responding agencies.  Team 
members participated at these events by asking questions and/or discussing the progress of 
the project.  Notes were made at these events, which were included in subsequent analyses.  
 
 
                                               
10 http://www.lakedistrict.gov.uk/caringfor/projects/valleyplanning/ullswatervalleyplanning  
Date Title 
Location Organiser 
Oct 2012 
Northern Flood Action Group (NFAG) – 3rd 
Annual Conference 
Carlisle NFAG 
Oct 2013 Multi Agency Response to Flooding Whitehaven 
Cumbria County Council 
Resilience Unit 
Nov 2013 
3rd Annual Open Meeting, on river 
management 
Lorton Melbreak Communities 
Jan 2014 
Community Emergency Plan – Inception 
Meeting 
Workington Environment Agency 
Mar 2014 Keswick Flood Recovery Group (KFRG) Keswick KFRG 
Mar 2014 
Community Emergency Plan – Update 
Meeting 
Workington Environment Agency 
Oct 2014 
“Building Resilience – Now And For The 
Future” 
Penrith Cumbria Resilience Forum 
Table 4.2: Community Events attended 
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5.7 Qualitative Data Analysis 
Once transcripts and other notes from the various research activities had been produced, 
they were imported into the qualitative data analysis (QDA) software package Nvivo© to 
facilitate a grounded analysis (Strauss and Corbin, 1998). The initial QDA took the form of 
re-reading the texts, notes and images in order to identify codable phenomena, with the 
codes emerging from the analysis covering a full range of subjects.  This collation of codes 
created a dataset of quotes that could be understood as revealing the range of participant 
perceptions and attitudes toward identifiable resilience relevant phenomena.  Using the two 
research frameworks (SLA and emBRACE) as guides, these phenomena were then 
classified into themes that covered concepts such as community, IEM (actions), resources 
and capacities (including governance) and learning (Appx 2). It is through this illumination of 
the multiple themes and the complex, sometimes contradictory, aspects of phenomena that 
a richer and more informative picture can be revealed and more encompassing explanatory 
theories deduced.  Once themed and explored for their explanatory value, internally within 
themes and across other themes, the coded text was finally analysed to select key quotes 
that would be capable of illustrating particular phenomena for explanation. 
5.8 Social Network Analysis 
Social network mapping is being undertaken in collaboration with associates at the 
Stockholm Environment Institute (SEI York and SEI Oxford).  On the 15th October 2013 a 
workshop was held in Keswick with 11 participants to identify social networks drawn upon 
during the response and recovery phases of the 2009 flood. The workshop acted as an 
exploratory session to assess whether it would be appropriate to further investigate social 
networks in the context of this study and also to recruit Keswick participants for follow-up 
interviews.  Initial results (Taylor et al., forthcoming), suggested that further network analysis 
could be useful in developing a clearer understanding of how the Cumbria ‘community of 
resilience practice’ operates.  
Accordingly, a second social network mapping exercise was designed to: 1) identify what 
type of support/resources (e.g. physical, social, emotional, financial) were sought by 
members of the community before, during and after the 2009 flood; 2) identify gaps in 
resource flows; and 3) identify which actors represent key brokers and barriers to accessing 
these resources.  
Data on social networks was obtained by analysing the 65 semi-structured interview 
transcripts and local workshop outputs (see section 5.6).  Although social network analysis 
was not part of the original methodological design, social networks did emerged strongly in 
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this analysis and provided important foundations for conceptualising explanatory hypotheses 
related to social capital and the role of networks in mobilising resource sets.  However, as 
the research design did not factor in specific social network questions a degree of caution is 
required in the interpretation of the results of the mapping exercise and this will be reflected 
in any supportive narrative. 
Social network data included details about the networks of individuals and organisations 
(actor-based data) as well as information on the purpose of the network connection/ 
exchange between individuals and organisations (relational data).  A sample of the social 
network data related to two key individuals is attached at Appendix 3. Initial analysis involved 
identifying the prominent actors within a network through the calculation of the highest 
scores against betweenness centrality (over 500) and degree centrality measures (over 25). 
Betweeness centrality measures the indirect connections of each actor and is derived from 
counting the number of shortest paths between individuals in the network. Betweeness 
centrality results in identifying individuals who are key conduits of information and illustrates 
a broader network with indirect connections and integrative sub-networks (Cassidy and 
Barnes, 2012).  Degree centrality simply denotes the number of actors that are connected to 
an individual as an overall measure of network integration (Ibid.).  Substantive details of the 
overall coding and analysis strategy and outcomes of the social network analysis will be 
presented in the forthcoming joint emBRACE WP4 deliverables 4.2 and 4.4, but an example 
of a SNM mapping output is detailed in Box 6.1 (section 6.3.1). 
6. Resilience in the Context of Capacities/Resources, 
Learning and Actions: Insights from the North of 
England 
6.1 Introduction 
This section is split into two principal parts to describe the research exploration of, 
respectively, the rural farming and rural village communities and those in the three main 
case-study towns; Keswick, Cockermouth and Workington.  The section takes a narrative 
style to describe factors, which emerged during analysis as bearing particularly relevance to 
resilience, with short sections to summarise these findings through an SLA lens.   
6.2 Rural Resilience 
The rural community investigated can be roughly split between the upland farms and the 
villages.  The resilience against hazards of even these two interlinked groups displayed 
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interesting differences and an attempt at aligning the discussion with framework elements 
relevant to each section has been attempted. 
6.2.1 Rural resilience: Farming 
Hill farming in Cumbria underpins much of the Lake District tradition and culture that make 
the National Park so popular.  Yet, the challenges presented by reduced profit margins, low 
expectations in relation to farm succession (i.e. retiring farmers not being replaced by a 
younger generation), reduced incentives to farm sheep and to use the high fell for grazing, 
along with the sheer physical challenges of this type of farming, mean that without targeted 
interventions traditional hill-farming livelihoods were already under threat before the 2009 
event (Mansfield, 2011).  Whilst these farming traditions are based on a powerful ethic that 
could be summed as “Farmers just want to farm” (C03_M_1), these pressures have meant 
that diversification activities can now be the profitable mainstay for farms, with the farmer’s 
partner or spouse (typically organised along traditional gender roles) running the household 
as well as (e.g.) operating a Bed and Breakfast or holding down a full or part-time job off the 
farm, in addition to assisting on the farm at busy times: 
“…we have quite a lot of stock, a biggish farm and there’s only [Margaret] and me and my dad 
and my dad’s 70 this year so it’s just how far you go. Bed and breakfast and farming.  And 
[Margaret] works as well; she has a part time job as well, so. And the bed and breakfast and 
[Margaret’s] part time working make more money than the farm.” C54_M_4      
Notwithstanding flood risks, the hill-farming ‘community’ could, therefore, be regarded as 
resilient in the sense that it has maintained its overall function in the face of considerable 
mounting pressures.  How the flood of 2009 influenced this resilience is discussed below 
from an SLA perspective; however, as these are closely intertwined, they are not separated 
out in this section. 
Regardless of the accumulating challenges, farmers have managed the fells for generations, 
through the use of a sophisticated flock/herding system, which utilises pasture and grazing 
at different altitudes dependent on time of year: 
“…what people don’t seem to understand, the sheep go on the fells and do a good job out 
there but the only way they can survive and keep healthy is when they do come in to the in-
bye land, they could get a good change of grass.  I’ve always said it’s just their caviar, the 
valley floor’s their caviar and that sort of gives them a boost and the 3 or 4 times a year 
they’re down here that gives them the boost and the goodness to survive on the poorer 
ground the rest of the time.” C34_M_4 (emphasis added)       
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In a series of floods that culminated in 2009 large areas of this “caviar” pasture land in the 
upper catchment were repeatedly covered in gravel and sediment, often several feet thick, 
which meant that this valuable ‘natural’ resource was threatened.  Farmers along the course 
of the Derwent found that in order to restore this prime ‘in-bye’ land to a condition suitable for 
grazing and fodder production (i.e. hay/silage mowers could not be used on stone-covered 
land) they needed to either pay someone to remove the gravel, or they needed to do it 
themselves.   
Key organisations did use the opportunity to try to encourage farmers to let the affected 
pasture ‘go back to nature’, because of the cost of remediation but also the fact that this 
re-naturalisation would comply with certain water-quality related targets and could be 
integrated within a farm’s inclusion into a High-Level Stewardship (HLS) arrangement 
(Natural England, 2013).  However, the strong emotional attachment that farmers have 
with their land meant that instead of thinking about adapting their fields to new land-
management methods: 
 “…[they] put their hands in their own pockets and paid to restore them … because that feels 
part of their farming system.  It might only be a little percentage, but it’s part of their farming 
system which they need, it could be silage field, could be a field they put sheep before they 
lamb, whatever it might be, and it needs to be put back.” (C05_F_1) 
Land value was not, however, purely determined by its agricultural quality.  Much of the 
affected land had what could be termed as natural-capital value because it lay within 
designated Special Areas of Conservation (SAC) and some of the river reaches had 
themselves been declared as Sites of Special Scientific Interest (SSSI).  This resulted in 
conflict between some different individuals’ and organisations’ perspectives, with the 
difference of opinion revolving around understanding what sediment deposition should be 
understood as in terms of land management: 
“Let’s say you have a wetland SSSI its designated for its botanical interest and then a flood 
comes and causes some damage to that SSSI then if that wetland is in a flood plain then the 
floodplain will be seen as an active process and whatever impact that has on botanic diversity 
it’s just one of those things” C55_M_1 
The other perspective was that inundation and deposition represented a spoiling of a pristine 
environment, which needed to be rectified for the land to have its value returned: 
“…how do you restore a damaged SSSI?  And it’s like a town, isn’t it, how you restore a 
damaged town?  What’s more important, the access, people’s homes, the services, the water, 
the gas?  And there is a procedure isn’t there?  And somebody’s actually worked out what the 
priorities are.  But for rural areas, or for the sort of the back woods, there’s nothing.  And I’ve 
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been very concerned about how you restore a damaged SSSI.  Nobody knows and nobody 
wants to know.” C15_M_3-3 
With land and river management practices during flood recovery being so contested, an 
important factor in getting the countryside ‘working’ again was the presence of key 
communicators within the managing agencies.  For example, one individual’s noted skill was 
not only in explaining complex hydrological processes, but in doing so in a way that clearly 
managed farmers’ expectations against what was achievable (in physical, economic and 
bureaucratic terms):  
“…he called a spade a spade because he wasn’t scared of saying what the [organisation he 
worked for was] trying to achieve and trying to put to bed some of the myths about gravel.  
And he knew about gravel, the dynamics of rivers and it’s a complex subject isn’t it, trying 
best to put that across.  And I have to say not everybody in agencies or representing 
agencies actually do that; I think that they’re kind of a bit soft, you know, when you’ve got 
somebody who’s a bit challenging on the other side.” C02_M_1 
Other individuals also proved themselves particularly important in terms of facilitating the 
local approach to river management that emerged as a result of the 2009 experience and 
which was facilitated by the funding that the rural experience of the floods attracted: 
“…it was also engaging people which is crucial in the short-term, that was [Ralph]’s tactic, I 
came to realise quite quickly.  He’s an astute man is [Ralph], I’d never heard of [Ralph] before 
at all and all of a sudden I came across him, and then he was everywhere” C02_M_1 
In terms of the wider catchment there were some cases where the shortfall in direct aid to 
farmers necessitated significant financial outlay on new equipment for sediment removal or 
additional transportation costs, related to feeding stock that had been moved to more distant 
pasture; these costs being borne by the farmer.  
The issue related to sediment deposition that caused particular tension between farmers and 
agencies was dredging.  Although the Lake District National Park prides itself on its 
“spectacular landscape, its wildlife and cultural heritage” (LDNPA, 2006) it also recognises 
that today’s landscape is the result of hundreds of years labour and adjustment by humans.  
This adjustment includes the historical channelisation of many of the region’s rivers, 
including the Upper Derwent, by the Cistercian monks in the 12th century (Interviewee 
C07_M_1).  The fact that channelisation and its related channel dredging has been going on 
for so long, was broadly recognised as introducing significant vulnerabilities to the 
agricultural land through which the rivers flow: 
“[This] engineering approach created a situation where here’s your river bed and there’s your 
flood plain you take the gravel out and you pile it on the bank with a machine[…], the next day 
30 
 
you get another flood event, another pile of gravel appears on top and another and you keep 
piling it up on the side but what’s actually happened now, in these places, is that the bottom of 
the river is now higher than the flood plain. Now what happens is you then take the diggers 
away and you stop digging this out so the next flood event that comes up, it overflows and it 
takes the gravel and it covers the flood plain with gravel.” C55_M_1   
The UK Government agencies’ regulation of channel management and local stakeholders’ 
capacities to influence these constraints were, therefore, the focus of considerable 
speculation and concern amongst project participants11.  One interesting take on this issue 
was illustrated by the work of one particular social network; the Borrowdale Whole Valley 
Planning Group. This group, consisting a range of riparian owners, valley residents and 
agency representatives, was originally formed in 2010, in order to develop a sustainable 
management plan for the valley, which was experiencing the combination of increased 
flooding, bank erosion, and sediment accumulation, along with increased incidences of low 
flow (Maas, 2011). This group collaboration resulted in the development of a management 
plan that proposed managing sediment accumulation (through skimming and dredging) in 
nine ‘hotspot’ locations along the river system.  This approach and the conclusions it 
reached were considered to be quite politically controversial by several participants:  
“…we almost ended up cutting across national policies.  I mean the [Environment] Agency 
and Natural England, their floodplain connectivity is the objective, isn’t it?  We did the 
opposite; we took gravel out the beck.” C02_M_1        
However, as one involved expert pointed out, even though the Environment Agency no 
longer had a remit for long-term gravel management…  
“…it’s not a credible position for an Authority in our position to say ‘no, we’re not going to 
[dredge], no, you can’t. That’s just an impasse, so what were the issues?  […] if the farmer 
wants to remove the gravel and put his energy into doing that, then effectively he can and 
he’s a riparian owner, he has a right to manage his banks and to maintain the river and allow 
water to pass freely though his land.”  C14_M_1 (emphasis added) 
This apparent confusion over whether dredging was allowed and whose responsibility it was 
to dredge developed as an underlying theme in the work, which echoes throughout current 
flood-risk management discussions in England (EFRA, 2014).  The Environment Agency 
                                               
11
 Even during the fieldwork phase of this project, river dredging regained in political importance, as 
the move away from physical channel management was invoked as a contributory factor in the 
flooding that occurred across southern England during the winter of 2013/14.   
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policy12 outlined by C14_M_1 could be considered as an illustration of the downward-shifting 
‘responsibilization’ for environmental management discussed in section 4.3.1.  The fact that 
such apparent shifting of control is set in a top-down bureaucratic context, which still seeks 
to constrain local-scale decision-making (e.g. through the consenting schemes), points to 
wider participation in flood risk governance but not necessarily to any changed degree of 
multi-level political control in that process (Walker et al., 2010): 
“We managed to get the money to [dredge] those areas as a one-off and the idea was once 
that big job had been done, the local people, i.e. the farmers in this instance, would go in, 
under constraint, under the rules governed by the Agency, and be able to do that themselves 
next time.  […]  Now that hasn’t really worked yet, partly because the Group’s gone into sleep 
mode, but also, it’s a real problem working through the consent system.  I know it inside out 
because I do it a lot but farmers just don’t want to know.  They don’t want to fill in reams of 
consent forms and pay £50 and wait 6 weeks, it’s just not their way of doing things.” 
C02_M_1     
The prohibitive nature of this level of bureaucracy is actually understood as problematic by 
Defra (Environment Agency, 2013b), but in terms of the Borrowdale work it still appeared to 
be having significant effects on the exposed community’s capability to organise its own 
resilient response to this threat to hill-farming’s resilience:   
“Now the sad thing is, the bits we’ve done already, if we don’t go back and maintain those 
fairly soon, there’s so much gravel in that system that we will go back to where we were 
before and that would be a bit of a shame really, given the effort’s that gone into it so far.” 
C02_M_1 
The assistance offered by other national and local stakeholders to affected farmers operated 
in other ways too, initially by simply identifying who had been impacted and then employing 
a coordinator to direct these individuals toward grants and other recovery resources.  Each 
affected farm was, for example, awarded a grant of £6,800 (€8,600) with which to carry out 
remedial work to rectify what was predominantly uninsurable damage (e.g. farm track repair)  
Support also included gravel removal advice but also assistance toward the one-off 
replacement of damaged watercourse fencing.  The fencing issue was particularly interesting 
from a ‘physical’ resilience perspective because whilst fence replacement was strongly 
                                               
12 The Environment Agency is responsible for issuing consents for work conducted in Main 
Rivers, whereas Internal Drainage Boards and Lead Local Flood Authorities are responsible 
for authorising work on ordinary watercourses. 
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advocated in terms of assisting toward meeting EU water-quality standards, the widespread 
adoption of initially more expensive short-length, straight-wire fence construction, rather than 
standard “pig-netting” along high-risk sections of riverbank, has meant that future flood 
damage to this new fencing will be reduced (Interviewees, C05_F_1 and C16_M_3-3) (Plate 
6.1).  Whilst not all advice could provide such beneficial outcomes for the farmers, the 
advisor was held to have largely resolved or at least reduced the bulk of farmers’ financial, 
land management, and in some cases psychological and social, flood-related problems.   
 
Plate 6.1: 'Flood resilient' Single strand fencing (Borrowdale) ©H Deeming 2014 
 
Of course, farmers are not the only people who live in the rural parts of the catchment. The 
aging demographic of the county (section 4.2) is well illustrated by the propensity of 
newcomers (“Off-comers”) to retire into the villages and surrounding countryside.  Evidence 
of tensions within this mixed rural community emerged in relation to perceptions that their 
wish for “peace and tranquillity” cut across the fact that for others this is a working 
landscape.  Accordingly, whilst the attitudes of many off-comers were regarded with some 
ambivalence, even by fellow off-comers, there was one example of social/political dynamic, 
which included an element of flood within it that challenged simplistic ideas of a harmonious 
resilient rural community: 
“The Parish Council are making a road wider for [one farm] ‘cause the milk tanker goes up 
and there has been a little conflict because of it and the Parish Council have stepped in and 
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they are going to move a wall just to help solve the difficulties and that…that’s village life. 
They’ve all forgot about the farmer rescuing the bloody people out of the houses in the village 
on the night of the flood and now when he wants something done there’s tittle tattle and 
friction but he was risking his bloody neck to get some people out of them houses on that 
night of the flood, funny how short memories are.”  C54_M_4 
What this example makes clear is that despite there being evidence of conflict between 
traditional and newer residents the presence of formal governance structures, such as the 
parish council, does offer a forum for adjudication in disputes that threaten community 
values.  Parish councils’ capacities to act as linking assets between communities and the 
formal civil protection agencies will be discussed further in the next section.   
6.2.2 Rural resilience: Community Emergency Planning 
Two villages where interviews were conducted suffered significant impacts during the 2009 
event.  In Braithwaite, the Coledale Beck broke its banks and flooded around 32 houses in 
various hydrologically-exposed pockets.  In Low Lorton, several homes situated near the 
River Cocker were inundated and the village bridge was dramatically washed away taking a 
local man and his tractor with it: luckily he survived.  This community has also suffered 
additional flooding since 2009: 
“In fact since then, despite the fact that we’re constantly told ‘Oh, this is 1 in 100 year 
episode’, we’ve actually had summer flooding, which has caught people out because they 
don’t expect that kind of weather in the summer.” C17_F_4   
In both villages the community response to these flood events and to flood risk more 
generally was identifiable in the emergence or extension of highly localised risk management 
and emergency planning processes.  
In Braithwaite and Lorton, the community response to the 2009 flood could be characterised 
as spontaneous emergence (Dynes, 2005a), which resulted from the fact that the magnitude 
of the event was such that formal responders were largely unavailable for deployment 
outside the locations experiencing the highest levels of social risk (i.e. the towns).  Whilst 
understandable, this focused deployment of overstretched formal civil protection resources 
led to predictable but also pragmatic responses by those intent on protecting their 
communities:  
“…several people had phoned the council and tried to phone numbers where they thought 
they would get some assistance from local council or the government and they were told no 
chance you are on your own so hence we were just literally throwing pavement slabs up and 
all sorts of things to cause a barrier.” C03_F_3-3 
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As well as heroic behaviour by individuals witnessing extreme examples of individual risk 
(Kasperson, 2005): 
P1 “[Name] went over the bridge  
P2 just before the bridge went in the water  
P1 just before it collapsed, in the tractor.  To try and get people on the other side 
because it was terrible on the other side and they are used to flooding, they food if 
not every year, every other year their houses would flood but this was a lot worse 
than, the houses were going to go you see so it was that bad. And [name], one of our 
neighbours, on a tractor, he went over, he had the biggest tractor so he went over, he 
shouldn’t have done.” C54_M-F_4 
The, not uncommon, realisation that they would always likely be ‘on their own’ (King, 2000) 
in a future event of similar magnitude catalysed a desire in some community members to 
develop a contingency planning process.  
In Lorton this planning was facilitated by a local 3rd sector worker, mentioned above as a 
key-individual because he had also played an important role in the Borrowdale Whole Valley 
Planning initiative.  The Lorton group were, in fact, a key ‘early adopter’ (Rogers, 2003) of 
the ACTion for Communities in Cumbria 10-step emergency planning process (ACT, 2012).  
Although the concept of emergency planning came largely from their experiences during the 
flood, the activity itself was an extension of a pre-existing community-planning forum, which 
had been convened, again with facilitation from ACT,  to consider ways in which the Lorton 
and wider Melbreak communities could determine their own future (Melbreak Communities, 
2011).   
“…2 years ago we achieved publication of our first Community Plan.  One of the priorities for 
action which emerged from that Plan was to develop an Emergency Plan.  […] There is 
definitely an appetite locally for the peace of mind that we believe comes with some sort of, 
albeit informal mechanism, which can respond in the event of flooding, or indeed other kinds 
of emergency.” C17_F_4 
The fact that the emergency planning ‘task’ was actioned as an extension of this community-
planning group’s interests was regarded as part of its strength.  This was because there was 
less likelihood than with a single-issue group that members would get disillusioned and leave 
if no emergency occurred to test their preparedness (C32_M_3-1).  The importance of the 
principle, of developing community capacities, as well as more focussed sustainable civil 
protection processes, by integrating them with existing institutional structures, is well 
understood (Handmer and Dovers, 2007, Gilchrist, 2003, Kretzmann and McKnight, 1993). 
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In Braithwaite the planning process was truly emergent, with a small group convening in the 
aftermath of the flood to both plan for future events, but also to advocate for risk mitigation 
measures to be developed for the village and at the behest of the Parish Council, a wider 
administrative area known as the ‘Derwent 7’: 
“Now this meant according to [the National Flood Forum] that we were at that point [in time] 
the Flood Group with the biggest geographical area in the whole of the UK […]with the 
smallest population, the smallest physical group, the fewest members, the largest 
geographical area with the most diverse of problems” C03_F_3-3 
Despite the scale of the challenge, the small flood group engaged with multiple stakeholder 
authorities and developed a sophisticated understanding of their local flood history.  Their 
engagement led to works being carried out in the beck above the river (Plate 6.2), a stretch 
of which was itself categorised as ‘main’ river in order that the Environment Agency could 
take over responsibility for its management.  These outcomes and the successful advocacy 
that enabled them, were made possible due to the skills, learning capacity and persistence 
of the group’s membership.  For example, one member’s knowledge of contingency 
planning, which was gained during a related professional career, meant that his expertise 
provided a useful resource for the Parish Councillors to whom the concept was completely 
new: 
“I remember the Chairman of the Parish Council saying ‘I haven’t got a clue what this is all 
about, we haven’t got any money, we haven’t funds, we haven’t got any resources’ and all the 
rest of it. But now basically what they have been told to do is start planning, ‘but what do we 
plan for?’  you plan for resilience, you plan for emergencies. ‘What emergences do we plan 
for?’” C61_M_1     
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Plate 6.2: Braithwaite Sediment Catch Pit (note fish ladder) ©H Deeming 2013 
 
In relation to planning for rural-community response, ‘You’re on your own’ was clearly 
acknowledged as not only being a concern in relation to this population’s access to human 
CP resources (i.e. uniformed rescuers).  The loss of, or closure of bridges for safety reasons, 
across the county after the event, led to severe transport disruption for rural dwellers as well 
as those in the towns.  However, another factor that was identified as fundamental in terms 
of rural communities’ resilience to hazards was the importance of robust communications 
infrastructure: 
“…there’s one extraordinary assumption, doesn’t really only relate to flooding, but is relevant, 
and that is that everybody assumes that in the event of a weather-related emergency, we’re 
going to be able to pick up the phone and get help or inform people.” C17_F_3-3 
This communications-infrastructure issue is important, because if rural communities are 
expected to cope largely on their own during wide-area emergencies, then the focus turns to 
ensuring that those communities receive warnings at the earliest opportunity.  Early 
warnings, supplied to people prepared to take ‘effective action’ to reduce their hazard 
exposure can mean the difference between communities conducting successful ‘dry’ 
evacuations and their need to be ‘wet’ rescued.  Although social responses to early warnings 
is not straightforward (Grothmann and Reusswig, 2006, Handmer, 2000), the principle 
remains that timely and trustworthy warnings can extend the time available for individuals to 
deliberate, confirm and to effectively respond (Glantz, 2004).  Avoiding the need for all 
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communities – but isolated communities particularly – rather than trained professionals, to 
conduct hazardous rescues is of paramount importance in terms of emergency management 
(Glantz, 2004, Mileti and Sorensen, 1990).  Therefore, one commendable innovation within 
Cumbria Resilience Forum’s approach to the 10-step Community Emergency Planning 
(CEP) initiative, is two-fold.  1) Police control room IT systems have recently been 
programmed to provide Control Room staff with the details of designated contacts in 
constituted CEP groups13 in order that they can be engaged in responding to appropriate14 
dynamic incidents in their areas at the earliest opportunity.   2) Constituted CEP groups have 
also been recently granted access to the UK Met Office’s ‘Hazard Manager’15 resource.  This 
means that as well as having access to standard public warning services (e.g. the 
Environment Agency ‘Floodline’16 and river gauge telemetry17) these groups can now access 
some of the same dynamic weather risk assessments as the professional responding 
agencies.  Notwithstanding the likely complexity surrounding how exactly communities will 
use Hazard Manager to inform their response choices (Handmer, 2000), the significant issue 
remains from the quote above, that rural areas need to have a sufficiently robust 
communications and IT infrastructure in place in order for them to have reliable access to 
such resources in the first place.  
6.2.3 Rural community resilience: summary 
Rural villages and outlying areas of the Derwent catchment have suffered a range of 
significant impacts from flood events over the last few years, of which the 2009 was only 
one.  The rural ‘community’ that suffers these impacts can, however, be best understood as 
complex, with one obvious differentiation being that which exists between the traditional 
Cumbrian farming families and the increasingly prevalent ‘off-comers’.  In this context it may 
be helpful to consider the hill-farming community as a tightly bonded community of identity, 
which has persisted and sustained its practice largely only as a result its tenacity and 
                                               
13
 Statement by Assistant Chief Constable Steve Johnson (Cumbria Constabulary) at ‘Building 
Resilience – Now and for the Future’ conference, Penrith, Cumbria 9
th
 Oct 2014  
14
 It is assumed that what constitutes an appropriate incident for CEP group inclusion would be a 
subjective decision by the control room supervisor. 
15
 http://www.metoffice.gov.uk/publicsector/hazardmanager  
16 https://fwd.environment-agency.gov.uk/app/olr/home  
17 http://www.gaugemap.co.uk/  
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capacity to adapt and diversify.  In other words, hill farming has itself proven remarkably 
resilient in the face of multiple continued pressures, of which flooding is only one.  However, 
a combination of the governmental downward-shifting of  responsibility for flood 
management, whilst still maintaining a ‘steering’ role  (Watson et al., 2009, Walker et al., 
2010) and the chronic nature of farmers’ flood exposure and vulnerability, means that in 
some locations farmers are actively engaging with the authorities in order to co-develop land 
and river management practices that offer benefits (or rather, fewer costs) to their traditional 
hill-farming business model.  Whilst such forums have been deemed successful in achieving 
relatively innovative outcomes, the evidence suggests that their sustainability is dependent 
on the tenacity of certain “community champions” (C16_M_3-3) and other individuals, 
without whose leadership, interest and grass-roots engagement rapidly wanes (Cashman, 
2009).  Direct impacts of the 2009 event led to a mobilisation of financial and physical 
assistance to affected farmers, however, bureaucracies developed to manage the 
government priority of reconnecting rivers with their floodplains meant that remediation was 
not straightforward.  How this farming community will maintain its resilience in a future that 
threatens more extreme floods is uncertain, but given the consequences of high-magnitude 
floods for the operation of in-bye pasture it seems that this additional pressure may push the 
industry toward a threshold beyond which the traditional farming culture may need to change 
significantly.   
In the villages the mix of Cumbrian and off-comer is in places quite stark: 
“Q So you’ve lived here all your life? 
P1 39 years. 
Q How has the village changed?  
P1 Everybody’s got older. Half the houses are empty. Not as many kids. What happens 
is people come here to die; they come here old, young semi-retired people ‘cause they can 
afford to and then they don’t make any noise or activities or, they just want peace and 
tranquillity.” C54_M_4   
However, the skills and resources of many of these ‘immigrants’ have been shown to affect 
local resilience, by driving local governance processes as well as by introducing new skills 
and attitudes into a traditional setting.  The realisation that rural areas will be largely left to 
their own devices in any extreme flood (as has been the experience in both 2005 and 2009), 
has also driven an active engagement with local-scale emergency planning that has been 
encouraged by the formal responder agencies. 
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Cumbria Resilience Forum has also been proactive in the integration of rural community 
groups into local warning and informing networks.  This should be regarded positively, but 
the limitations of communications infrastructure resilience (especially mobile and broadband) 
in rural areas should be acknowledged as potentially key constraints (Tapsell et al., 2005).  
Having examined the rural context, the next section looks at the more populous areas along 
the Derwent and investigates how these more urban communities exhibit their resilience to 
flood hazard. 
6.3 Urban Resilience 
6.3.1 Keswick 
Keswick is the first settlement of notable size along the River Derwent.  The town is situated 
beside Derwentwater, where the so named river outflows before its confluence with the River 
Greta.  This proximity to two rivers and its low relative topography meant that parts of the 
town suffered severe flood impacts to residential and commercial properties during the 
floods of both 2005 (198 buildings) and 2009 (300 buildings).  The earlier 2005 flood 
experience in the town and the community’s proactive responses to that event did, however, 
play a significant role in shaping its response to the 2009 event: 
“So we were galvanised and we were prepared and the community was engaged and we had 
a difficult job to do but it was a damn sight easier than it could have been because the work 
that the Flood Action Group had done made the town very flood-aware.  And the work that the 
Environment Agency, [Laurie T] had done in setting up the Flood Action Group and the 
publicity that they’ve had locally, you know we’re a community of only about 5,000, but when 
someone knocked on the door, whether it was a volunteer, Police Office, Fire-fighter, 
Mountain Rescuer and said ‘you’re house is going to flood’; when they got their text message 
alert, they’d be all signed up for it, they were very, very flood-aware, the community, so a lot 
of property, moveable property was secured and was saved.” C13_M_1 
Formed following the 2005 event, Keswick Flood Action Group (KFAG) had been proactive 
in engaging with Cumbria Resilience Forum partners in developing risk mitigation solutions 
for the town.  The emergency planning and the emergency coordination that was undertaken 
by KFAG had, for example, resulted in a dedicated emergency-coordination phone line being 
wired into the Town Hall the day before the flood (C04_M-3-3).  This in turn allowed the 
evacuation and rescue activity on the day and the recovery work afterward to be led from 
this room.  Having evolved as a result of these experiences, the Community Emergency 
Plan (CEP) for Keswick is now sophisticated in detail and encompasses numerous specific 
preparedness and response actions to be taken chronologically by community volunteers, 
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from the initial receipt, local assessment and sharing of formal and informal severe weather 
warnings, through the monitoring of river-level thresholds, to the point where volunteers 
need to retreat from predictable flood areas before they are inundated.   
One important aspect of KFAGs response function is that, from inception, its membership 
has been split between members whose homes are hazard exposed and those that are not.  
This is an important segregation, because it means that in the event of a flood the group 
members who do not need to be concerned about their homes flooding can give their 
undivided support to the residents who are at risk: 
“…the morning after 2005 we went round, essentially we had a walk round to see how high 
the lake was and realised how bad the problem would be, we called in to see [Catherine] and 
her husband] who are friends of ours and realised that they needed help with things like lifting 
carpets, and during the course of the day I think we lifted them for about 4 or 5 people; put a 
posse together and went round. And it was after that my wife said well what you need is 
people from outside who can come in and help before and afterwards. So that was the 
genesis.” C04_M_3-3 
However, KFAG has never been simply associated with preparedness and response.  The 
Group’s executive committee has always “given unwavering commitment to try to do the 
best to reduce flood risk for the future of the community” (KFAG, 2012: p.1) and whilst 
having the split group structure has been shown as extremely useful in terms of its flood 
response, it is apparent that there will always remain a difference between how the flood 
affected and unaffected perceive flood risk, even within the group, let alone in the wider town 
population: 
“I mean a lot of things you can’t teach; it’s like with the flood volunteers; it’s great that they are 
volunteers and want to go out but they don’t really understand how nervous people get way 
before it gets to the tipping point and I mean they are quite relaxed about it, thank God, 
they’re all OK about it, but there’s people like us going like ‘Arghh the river’s coming up’. So 
you can’t, there’s no way that you can put that experience on somebody else’s shoulder’s and 
them understand it, it just doesn’t work. And no words describe how it feels.” C15_F_3-3  
Regarding this strong and prior-research corroborating evidence that affected communities’ 
will bear impacts on their psychological well-being (Fordham and Ketteridge, 1995, Tapsell 
and Tunstall, 2008, Whittle et al., 2010), the ‘Cumbria Resilience’ community of practice also 
includes other 3rd sector organisations whose role is concerned with promoting well-being.  
One of these organisations is ‘Churches Together in Cumbria’ (CTiC).  After the flood, CTiC 
was responsible for setting in place one of the most popular and practical resources in 
Keswick, St Herbert’s Flood Support Centre, or simply ‘the Soup Kitchen’.  This facility, 
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which was staffed by church volunteers, provided a social hub for affected residents, where 
they could talk or do practical things like charge mobile phones or network in other ways: 
“…we referred to the soup kitchen which was just down the road, I mean the soup was 
dreadful (laughs) we only had it once, but as a meeting place, go round and talk, sit at tables 
and talk to people, ‘what are you doing and who?’ somebody said to me ‘oh there’s somebody 
really good in Carlisle, I’m having him down to advise on a pump’, I immediately said ‘right 
give me his name and phone number’ that was the information” C18_F_3-3  
The social-hub concept was not unique in the town, with CTiC and other organisations 
setting up similar facilities across the county (e.g. Christchurch in Cockermouth).  The 
location of the kitchen close to the flood-impact epicentre was important too, because it 
meant that volunteers were able to host themed meetings (e.g. about insurance issues) as 
well as to provide a form of intelligence service for those affected, but also for the authorities 
who needed to be aware of any social vulnerability issues.  This type of role fitted well with 
the local church ethos that had already led CTiC to develop contingency plans as a 
response to its own involvement in a number of emergencies across the county, from the 
2001 Foot and Mouth disease outbreak, to the repeated flooding, to a fatal coach crash and 
the Derrick Bird shooting murders (CTiC, 2014); dealing with all of which had required a 
practical and sensitive approach from this locally trusted and respected community institution 
(C37_F_1).       
In terms of other actions, related to flood recovery and risk mitigation, the focus of much 
KFAG activity since its inception has been in advocating for structural and non-structural 
flood defence measures.  In order to do this, the group members have engaged fully with 
and developed effective working relations with the formal flood-risk management agencies 
and other water management institutions. Their committee seat on the multi-agency Keswick 
Flood Recovery Group (KFRG) and founding affiliation with the Northern Flood Action Group 
(NFAG) have injected an element of political pressure to their negotiating capacity at up to 
national scale.  From its inception this capacity has included the negotiations in the 
aftermath of the 2005 event that resulted in the town being awarded a £6.1 million grant to 
build a flood defence scheme on the River Greta.  This came too late for the properties re-
flooded in 2009, but it was completed in 2012.  Other areas of the town, however, were still 
vulnerable to surface water flooding and KFAG campaigned for funding and support in order 
to develop surface-water pumping options for these areas too.  After years of negotiation 
over pumping capacities, responsibilities and funding KFAG formally accepted delivery of 
two mobile pumps on behalf of the town in July 2014 (Plate 6.3). The fact that one of these 
pumps is to be permanently stationed in a section of the town that has already undergone 
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significant drainage improvements would suggest, however, that the exposure and 
vulnerability of the housing in that area remains a cause for concern until a new underground 
pump solution is installed in 2015 (pers comm, C15_F_3-3). 
 
Plate 6.3: The handover of surface-water pumps to KFAG ©S Taylor 2014 
The fact that participation in these negotiations has itself greatly increased the expertise 
within this advocacy group (Tesh, 1999) has undoubtedly led to some positive outcomes for 
this community as it has for the other catchment communities with flood action or advocacy 
groups.  However, the fact that FAG members inevitably assimilated a great deal of quite 
technical knowledge and were therefore able to question the agencies with whom they were 
dealing, sometimes led to frustrations.  This point is best illustrated by a KFAG member who 
provided a detailed account of her frustration in trying to understand Defra’s flood defence 
funding system (see section 4.3.1): 
“…one of the problems that we’ve got this flood development grant in aid is if you do the 
attenuation thing it’s supposed to protect 76 properties, if you do pumping because its only 
around [named] Road it only protects 15 so that’s not very many. If you do the attenuation 
and you don’t do it with pumping then the pumping people are never going to get any help 
because it will come into double counting of benefits. So the only way that we can get an 
adequate financial solution for the town that might be affordable is to get both done at once. 
On their figures, in both reports they sent us, it’s more feasible to do both because they don’t 
have to raise so much locally, but they just don’t want to do it. And when you’ve got these 
figures that say for flood development grant in aid for attenuation its protecting 76 properties, 
pumping is 15, which is the same but it would be with that 76 ‘cause the attenuation would 
help the 15 that are and then it says to do both schemes it only protects 48 properties, now 
how can that be? That just doesn’t make sense does it?” C15_F_3-3 
As with gravel management upstream, however, these issues relating to the actual practical 
management of flooding also revealed a divergence between the apparent aspiration 
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projected by European and UK civil protection rhetoric, of wishing to hand over more 
responsibility to communities to manage their own risk (Steinführer et al., 2010) and the 
policy environment that made such aspirations impossible to realise, at least from the 
perspective of the actual exposed-communities:   
“It gets me furious because [Council Emergency Planning Officer] used to stand up in front of 
everybody and give these talks about resilience and say ‘how many ambulances are on duty 
in Cumbria?’ and you’d have to guess and ‘how many police?’ and all the rest of it ; ‘therefore 
you have to look after yourself’. Then we’ve got [Name FAG member] down [the] road who 
wants to hire a pump to pump water into the river and away from his property. Can he do it? 
Oh no! Because of health and safety. You can’t open a drain, you can’t have a pump, you 
can’t do this, you can’t do that, ‘who’s goings to insure it?’ ‘If we help you by refunding you the 
money are we going to be responsible for it?’ People actually in this community cannot do 
anything for themselves because health and safety gets in the way and all the rules and 
regulations. You just can’t do a thing, and I don’t know how you can square telling somebody 
as a community that if Cumbria is hit every community will have to survive on its own.” 
C15_F_3-3 
Whilst the physical safety of community members is obviously a concern, the fact these new 
surface-water pumping measures will, by agreement with KFAG, still need to be operated by 
formal responder staff, does introduce an element of risk in terms of whether these staff 
resources will actually be available in the event of another high-magnitude event striking the 
town.  However, it also reemphasises the point made previously, that if the operation of the 
albeit improved non-structural measures in the town remains the responsibility of county-
scale agencies and their finite staff, rather than of the residents themselves, then the ‘you’re 
on your own’ principle will continue to apply across the rural population; as staff who might 
otherwise have been able to respond beyond high-population centres are still retained to 
operate town-based measures. 
As in the rural areas, Keswick’s hard-won community resilience against flooding could be 
said to be underpinned by a number of key individuals.  Most prominent amongst those 
would be the members of KFAG, who have lobbied so strongly for risk mitigation 
interventions (Box 6.1 uses social network mapping to illustrate the social connectedness of 
two principal KFAG members).  For the reasons pointed out above, however, those group 
members directly affected by the flooding in the town have also been the strongest 
advocates for structural measures and for continued engagement and risk management.  
This is hardly surprising, because it is these individuals who would bear the direct 
consequences of another flood.  However, this does not mean that these individuals are not 
fully aware of the limitations of flood walls and pumps.  On the contrary, as Lane et al. (2011) 
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have previously observed, such individuals‘ risk perceptions and expectations can be 
founded on a sophisticated understanding of hydrological principles: 
“I think the thing that I learnt from that last flood is that we need to be much more alert and 
proactive all the time and forever and you can’t rest on your laurels ‘cause we just don’t know 
what that river defence is going to do. I personally because I’m very negative, I’m nowhere 
near a Pollyanna I personally can’t see how it’s going to work because I think if you, I mean 
we had 40 centimetres of water in this house, I mean it was up to my knees and if you fold all 
that water from that back hill up to the river wall now and plonk it in the river how’s it going to 
get through that bridge?” C15_F_3-3  
The implication of this quote is that this particular person fully understands the standard of 
protection limitations of the town‘s £6.1M structural defence scheme (Plate 6.4) and, 
accordingly, that she remains exposed to considerable residual risk. 
 
 
Plate 6.4: Keswick Flood Wall © M Fordham 2012 
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This on-going exposure to residual risk brings us to the need to consider issues other than 
formal civil-protection related actions.  It is well known that flood-affected communities do not 
face any period of recovery in the same way that they face an emerging hazard event.  
Recovery, is a much more individualising experience, where the flood affected are required 
to negotiate their way back to “maintaining their essential function, identity and structure“ by 
engaging with new sectors and actors and for some this experience was remembered as 
“worse than the actual event“ (C04_M_3-3).  This ‘recovery gap‘ “emerges during the longer 
process of recovery at the point where the legally-defined contingency arrangements 
provided to the affected community by its local authorities diminish and where the less well-
defined services provided by the private sector (e.g. insurance, building industry) start.“ 
(Whittle et al., 2010: p.120).  Experiences of the recovery gap were varied in Keswick and 
sometimes surprisingly so.   
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Box 6.1: Social Network Analysis of Keswick Community Members 
 
 
Figure 1:  Social network map of central female (C15) in Keswick  
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Figure 2:  Social network map of central male (C04) in Keswick. 
Figures 1 and 2 above represent social network maps for prominent female (C15) and male (C04) 
community members, as identified by high betweeness centrality scores in the research sample
18
.  
Both individuals are based in Keswick and are, or have been, active members of the Keswick Flood 
Action Group.  The maps show that these actors are directly and indirectly connected to a range of 
individuals and organisations across a range of sectors, including: government, emergency services, 
environment agency, private businesses, insurance companies and third sector groups.  The maps 
show that these individuals are part of a diverse social network and are on first name terms with many 
of their network links (as denoted by the number of connections with individual actors coded with the 
                                               
18 Centrality was measured using a betweeness centrality measure (see section 5.7 on methods).  Individuals that achieved 
scores above 500 were considered to have high centrality.  These two individuals received centrality scores that ranked in the 
top five highest scores in the overall sample, with scores of 1153 (C15) and 780 (C04).  
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prefix C).  These diverse network structures enable the provision of a range of resources (as shown 
by the different colour arrows) including: emotional, physical and financial support, to build resilience 
to flooding.  The individual networks also show strong collaborations and professional contacts, 
particularly with the governance sector, which helps with the acquisition of local and national flood 
information and promotes the activity of the Flood Action Group in government circles.   
The maps suggest that the broad networks of the two individuals contribute to the successful 
reputation and good work undertaken by the Keswick Flood Action Group.  Bringing together these 
well connected individuals in the form of a community flood action group enables for a concentration 
of social capital by combining the two social networks and this provides a powerful socio-political 
resource to the community. The availability of a broad and diverse set of network connections enables 
the group to target its resources to flood advocacy and response more effectively. The human capital 
possessed by these individuals in the form of flood awareness and education, enhanced through their 
networks, fosters expertise and skills that help them to undertake community activities and represent 
the Flood Action Group. The strong third sector presence is enhanced through bridging associations 
with other community groups (e.g. Rotary, Lions and Red Cross) as well as the Environment Agency, 
local government and emergency services. This broadens the network’s reach and strengthens the 
ability to draw in wider resources from outside the community.   
Figure 1 shows that physical support is mostly sought from local builders but also through neighbours 
who provide valuable advice and support regarding their own experiences with building companies.  
In figure 1 emotional support is mostly drawn from friends and neighbours and fellow Keswick Flood 
Action Group members as well as from the local GP.  In figure 2 the local church run soup kitchen 
support centre was the main source of emotional support following the flood. Although the sample is 
not representative, it is interesting to note this finding that the female actor mainly relied upon friends 
and neighbours for emotional support following the flood, whereas the male relied upon the local 
church soup kitchen.  The male also has more connections that perform an emergency services 
response role.  Both individuals are able to draw in socio-political capital and information about 
flooding through their connections with key regionally based Environment Agency staff (e.g. C49, 
C50, C78 & C82). These key connections with the Environment Agency regional staff enable 
increased engagement and collaboration to take place in Keswick, which fosters a deeper 
understanding of the hydrological factors underpinning local flood events as well as government 
policy and investment in relation to flooding.  Such collaborations enable more informed and targeted 
flood advocacy for flood defences in Keswick.   
The Environment Agency actors, as well as fellow Keswick Flood Action Group members, constitute 
central actors within the network (as denoted by the larger dots and surrounding network clusters) 
and these represent important sub-networks, which the individuals can harness as part of their wider 
social network. Hence connections generate additional connections (e.g. in figure 1 a connection to a 
professional contact is generated through an indirect connection to C49).   Socio-political capital is 
drawn in through linking with influential politicians as shown by connections with the local Mayor, local 
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MP and local Councillors and bridging with local and regional government officials.  These linked 
connections, in addition to connections to TV broadcasters and Royal affiliations, have been important 
for generating an increased public profile for Keswick and its flood risk problems, which has possibly 
helped in successfully pulling financial resources through government and community-based grants or 
donations.  
Negative exchanges between networks were identified through the resource category ‘complaint 
about service’. There are limited occurrences of these in the above social network maps.  The 
negative exchanges between networks tended to be more widely identified by residents in Workington 
who were not as well connected as the participants interviewed in Keswick, despite some being  
affiliated to the town’s flood action group. This demonstrates that communities require a range of 
resources to assist in building resilience to flooding and social networks play a key role in this.  The 
presence of strong human capital inhered within well-connected community members fosters actively 
engaged community groups and third sector presence (e.g. formally constituted Flood Action Groups), 
which helps to build good collective social and political capital in a community.  This diversity and 
concentration of social networks in Keswick contributes to the community’s effective mobilisation of a 
range of resources including: emotional, physical and financial as well as the ability to acquire up-to-
date information on flooding and professional links.  These elements amalgamate to strengtn the 
ability of the Keswick Flood Action group to successfully lobby for local flood defences and other 
forms of support on behalf of the local community of Keswick. 
 
For many this process proceeded efficiently.  However for others, these negotiations left 
householders and businesses (NB. some participants operate businesses out of their 
homes) stressed, frustrated and unhappy with the service they received. Even individuals 
who thought they had learned from previous poor experiences and who had changed their 
negotiation ‘tactics‘ accordingly, felt let down: 
“The first time we were out of the house for 51 weeks altogether, we were closed for 51 
weeks. And we had a builder from Manchester and he would just come one day and he’d say 
‘see you tomorrow’ and then we wouldn’t see him for 3 weeks. So this last time we had a local 
builder, he was somebody that used to be a neighbour I used to be with his wife, his cousin 
worked for the family firm mates with [my husband], we thought it was all going to be alright. It 
was awful.” C15_F_3-3 
The time these restorations took to complete also impacted in other ways, with household 
routines disrupted not only by the need to project manage the restoration of damaged 
properties, but to do so whilst also being forced to move from one ephemeral temporary 
accommodation to another: 
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P2 - There was one family who lived behind us in [road] and they were in something like 11 
different properties in 3 months. They were like a week here, fortnight there, 10 days there 
P1 - but that wasn’t to do with insurance, it was just because they couldn’t find them 
anywhere to stay. 
P2 - and because their jobs were in the supermarket here and they were being put out at 
places like Carlisle and it was 
P1 - the strain on them must have been just 
P2 - the strain on them was just staggering.  C18 (1-2)_F-M_3-3 
As with the engagement with the risk mitigation work, however, some individuals had 
sufficient resources that they were able to contest what they perceived as poor service and 
use their skills, knowledge and persistence to negotiate better deals for themselves: 
After a couple of days the doorbell rang and there was this woman with 3 men in tow.  ‘I’m 
from the insurance company, this is my surveyor, and these are 2 people’ whose names I 
don’t remember, ‘they’re builders and they can start clearing tomorrow’.  She marched in with 
a clipboard and said ‘right, we’ll want to strip out the plaster to a metre high, we’ll have all the 
floorboards up, you’ll be moved out for 6 months, blah, blah’.  I said, ‘no, we won’t’.  […] And 
in the end I said to this woman ‘go away, we’ll dry ourselves out’.  Because we have a 
different insurance company for the building and the contents for historical reasons, this was 
the buildings’ lot.  ‘We’ll dry ourselves out.  I don’t want big industrial dryers which dry 
everything and will crack the wood.  I want it done gently with lots of air and we’ll do it, on the 
understanding that we can come back in a couple of months and assess what we need to 
claim on the insurance and what we want done through you then, when we’ve dried it out 
slowly’.  So off she went with bad grace” C21_1_3-3 
These individuals, however, still suffered in the face of the complex and frustrating 
bureaucracy involved in recovery, but one key attribute was their ability to prioritise and to 
operate at a threshold, where they were able to get through each day with tasks completed: 
“I mean it was awful. How you actually deal with young children that are distressed and all the 
rest of it and go to work and meet builders, meet loss adjusters, meet the insurance company, 
deal with the never ending paper work it just took our lives over. And like we were saying last 
week we used to end up thinking OK I want to do this job today so you have this frog list, 
which is to eat a frog a day, the frog job was, you know and it might just be phone up and 
arrange an appointment for such a such but if I did that I’d achieved what I needed to do that 
day and I couldn’t do anything else and that was without having a life really, the way it would 
normally be. I mean I do another part time job as well.” C15_F_3-3 
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Keswick: Summary 
Keswick is regarded within the Cumbria ‘community of resilience practice’ as a 
beacon in terms of the way that flood risk mitigation has been taken into 
the heart of the hazard exposed population.  Prior experience of significant 
flooding had created the impetus for residents and local businesses to 
unite under the umbrella of the constituted Keswick Flood Action Group.  
As a result of this socio-political network and the knowledge and learned FRM expertise 
inhered within KFAG, preparedness and response actions during the 2009 event are widely 
acknowledged to have lessened the consequences of the flood for many residents.  
However, response capacity is only part of the story of Keswick’s flood resilience.  The fact 
that KFAG and key individuals within it have integrated themselves effectively into the 
‘Cumbria Resilience’ community, has also meant that key relationships have been 
developed to enable an effective (if often frustrating) co-development of physical mitigation 
measures.  Principal amongst these is the £6.1M structural scheme.  However, other key 
‘victories’ have included the purchase of surface-water pumps as well as collaboration in the 
planning for major drainage works. In terms of recovery, this more individualised and 
negotiated process has been borne by many households with stoic determination: despite 
evidence of learning from prior errors some people still had to contend with harsh 
experiences caused by others’ inefficiencies.  Social networking and the thoughtful provision 
of social hub facilities, where ‘floodees’19 could meet and let off steam by sharing their 
stories did, however, provide many with some of the vital support they needed during the 
protracted weeks and months of insecurity.        
6.3.2 Cockermouth 
Cockermouth is situated at the confluence of the River Derwent and the River Cocker.  As 
with Keswick, this position makes the town vulnerable to flooding from either of the rivers or 
from a combination of the two.  Accordingly, the lower-lying areas of the town have a long 
history of flooding and in recent years one area, The Gote, has been subjected to three 
separate flood inundations culminating in the 2009 event.  The flow confluence that occurred 
in 2009, however, was on a different magnitude than these earlier events (and historically 
unprecedented), with depths in the vicinity of Main Street reaching 2.44m (Plate 6.5) and 
                                               
19
 ‘Floodee’ was a phrase coined in Keswick to describe those who had been flooded.  It was 
regarded as preferable and more empowering than the often applied terms, flood ‘victim’ or flood 
‘survivor’  
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with ~200 people needing rescue in a highly dynamic multi-agency operation that became 
the focus of national media attention (Environment Agency, 2010). 
 
 
 
Plate 6.5: 2009 flood maximum  depth (2.44m ) marker board in Cockermouth ©M Fordham 
2012 
 
Due to its history, there was a great deal of accumulated experience of flooding in the town 
prior to the 2009 event, but what contributed most to the response to this event was that the 
entire, largely independently owned commercial centre had been inundated as well as the 
more chronically exposed areas.  This impact on the heart of the town precipitated concerted 
recovery-focussed activity from the local businesses: 
“I think because independent business traders are by nature used to being relatively decisive 
and relatively used to taking charge of their own future, as it were, that’s,  if we weren’t that 
sort of people we wouldn’t be in this sort of business. So you have a core initially of people 
who immediately understood that we’d got to organise, get something done and that talk 
wasn’t enough and we had to have actions” C06_M_4 
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What followed was a drive by a newly invigorated Chamber of Trade20 (CCoT) to use the 
event as “an opportunity” (C28_M_4).  This leadership was illustrated by a decision on the 
part of the CCoT to actively project the message “Cockermouth is Open for Business”: 
“That was the thing that we really grasped on straight away and that we also realised that 
there’s no mileage in, that the news media want to come and have the tearful, on the streets 
‘my life is in ruins’ and we wanted to give out the message, ‘OK, it’s been bad but we’re 
already doing something about it’.  Partly because the nature of the community and the 
Cumbrians, but also because it was important because it’s a trading town, it’s a trading town, 
and we knew that if people got into the habit of shopping elsewhere, we might never win them 
back.” C06_M_4 
Many of the affected businesses moved as ‘pop-up’ shops to a local auction rooms where 
they had space to trade, away from the disruptive restoration that was happening in the Main 
Street.  As well as the CCoT, the Local Authority also supported a business liaison officer 
who was able to “cut through the crap and bang heads together” (Chippendale, quoted in: 
Brignall, 2014).  Viewing the recovery as an ‘opportunity’ also allowed businesses to 
regenerate their premises (in strict accordance with building regulations) so that what re-
emerged over the next months and years was regarded as an improvement over what had 
been there before: 
“You wouldn’t choose to do it, but how often do you get a chance to completely rebuild a high 
street […] hopefully we are proof that you can bounce back.  But if you just wait for something 
to happen, it won’t” (Chippendale, quoted in: Brignall, 2014). 
The experiences across the commercial sector in Cockermouth were not, however, 
universally positive.  Fieldwork identified elements of dichotomy in relation to how different 
proprietors had weathered the impacts of the flood on their small businesses. Box 6.2 
presents an extract from Deeming et al. (in press) that discusses two such businesses, in a 
way that illustrates that even though the commercial centre of the town has visibly recovered 
and ‘bounced forward’ from some perspectives, the actual experience of recovery that has 
been lived by some business proprietors has been markedly different.  Both these 
businesses proved themselves ‘resilient’ in that they re-opened and continue to trade. 
However, the differences in personal experience that underpin these two individuals’ 
recovery trajectories raise an important issue for measuring resilience over time.  This is that 
recovery to ‘an acceptable level of functioning’ can be largely subjective in interpretation.  A 
                                               
20
 The town’s Chamber of Trade prior to the flood had been described as “moribund”  
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more important question to focus on would therefore be to investigate whether individuals’ 
and community recovery experiences indicate whether these entities could replicate a similar 
‘recovery’ again, or whether experience of another similar or lesser magnitude hazard would 
push them across a threshold into unsustainability.  From this perspective the idea of 
resilience as an indicator of a system of interest’s capacity to thrive (rather than to simply 
survive) should become greater interest (Arnold, pers comm: cited in emBRACE, 2013)   
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Box 6.2: Comparison of the resource and capacity differentials of two small businesses affected by 
the 2009 flood in Cockermouth, Cumbria  
This comparison utilises the Sustainable Livelihoods framework to identify qualitative resource/capacity 
differentials.  It was developed from data collected during emBRACE field-based research and was first 
reported in Deeming et al. (Forthcoming).  For confidentiality reasons the two small businesses interviewed 
are represented as Small Business ‘a’ (SBa) and Small Business ‘b’ (SBb). 
Resource Sets SBa (Small Business ‘a’) SBb (Small Business ‘b’) 
Human 
Resources 
Skills in technology, financial accounting; 
knowledge of possibility of opportunities; 
effective social skills for business; self-image as 
shy but capable 
Older owner; health issues; limited knowledge 
and skills related to technology; limited social 
skills for business; self-image as embattled 
Social and 
Political 
Resources 
Business as family concern; well-connected and 
networked; active and productive participation 
in trade bodies and community at large;  
Isolated, without visible family support for 
business; poor experience with trade bodies 
(led to cancelled membership);  
Financial 
Resources 
Availability of savings and credit; effective 
insurance; ownership of premises; financially 
productive use of post-flood services (e.g. 
temporary trading space); 
Low capital resources; ineffective insurance 
(unresolved and unresolvable claims); rented 
premises; financially unproductive use of post-
flood services (e.g. temporary trading space); 
Natural/Place-
based Resources 
Flood defences overtopped in extreme event; 
business has firm attachment to place; 
capitalises on river and cultural-historic location; 
effective use of post-flood services (e.g. 
temporary trading space);  
Flood defences overtopped in extreme event; 
limited  business attachment to place; 
ineffective use of post-flood services (e.g. 
temporary trading space);  
Physical 
Resources 
Historic building close to river limits resilience 
measures but many building alterations made 
for improve resilience; lives outside the town 
but access soon reinstated;  
Rejected original flooded premises (on safety 
grounds) and moved to alternative location; 
safer (on higher ground) but less good for 
footfall; lives outside the town but access was 
soon reinstated;  
 
“These are both local small business owners, sharing the availability of place-based resources (e.g. flood 
defences (overtopped in this event), disaster response, municipal commitment to town recovery and 
regeneration (including provision of services such as skips, etc.), charity and volunteer aid to the town). Both 
were hit badly by the floods and both businesses continued to operate during and after the flood. However, 
they had a different trajectory of recovery and differing resilience outcomes, which preliminary analysis 
identified as being dependent upon a complex mix of factors touching upon a range of resource sets and 
capacities. SBa generally recovered well with an expanded business, incorporation of many resilience 
measures (bounce forward) and a recognised place within the community. SBb recovered less well, with a 
business of similar size (bounce back) and a reduced sense of wellbeing and community embeddedness.  
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The differences between the two businesses’ recovery (and resilience status) are related strongly to the 
differences between the two business owners in terms of availability of economic capital, business acumen, 
social networks and individual psychology. In relation to one of our key components of resilience, social 
learning, these two small business owners had both benefited (albeit to differing degrees) from the social 
learning which had taken place in the town.  However, other factors served to limit its effectiveness or 
application. For example, although they were both beneficiaries of community level information and 
knowledge regarding the hazard and appropriate adaptation measures, they were limited in their adaptive 
capacity, not by a failure to learn but by matters such as the externally imposed constraints on physical 
alteration of historic buildings; or the personal limitations imposed on preferred action through limited financial 
means.”  Deeming et  al. (in press) 
 
 
Concurrent with the efforts to restore the businesses and homes, there were clear demands 
for the authorities to reduce the risk of such an event occurring again.  There followed an 
assessment of flood-risk management options, which looked at the relative benefits of a 
range of measures, from gravel management (dredging) (Brown, 2012) to catchment 
afforestation (ATKINS, 2012, Broadmeadow and Nesbit, 2010), to structural measures in the 
town.  Ultimately, as had occurred in Keswick, the final decision was to concentrate 
resources on developing a structural flood-defence scheme, which included a state-of-the-art 
water-pressure operated flood barrier (Plate 6.6).  After this assessment and planning 
process, which included considerable participation by the CCoT and Cockermouth Flood 
Action Group (CFAG), the finally agreed river-flood defence scheme was completed in 2014, 
with additional surface-water drainage infrastructure still being built at time of writing.  What 
was relatively unique about this particular scheme was that, unlike the Keswick flood wall 
that was paid for in toto by Defra grant, Cockermouth’s scheme came under the new 
partnership funding rules, whereby communities were required to pay a contribution 
themselves (see section 3.3) (Environment Agency, 2013a).  With grass-roots leadership 
and advocacy from the local groups a precept – democratically-approved by the community 
– was applied to local council tax bills and 1% was added to business rates. This raised over 
£100,000 of the final £4.45M required.  Other significant contributions, redirected from 
Council budgets and money collected from other fund-raising (e.g. the Cumbria Community 
Foundation), were also added to the £3.35M offered by the Environment Agency.  Although 
the principal concern of the campaigning groups was to raise the town’s standard of flood 
protection, the deliberations needed to agree the final scheme were always cognisant of the 
fact that protecting the town from a repeat of the ~1:500 event of 2009 would require 
fundamentally altering its physical characteristics.  Accordingly, the pragmatic solution was 
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to achieve a standard of protection of between 1:75 and 1:100, with the residual risk being 
understood as mitigated by property-level protection measures, where these were 
appropriate, or covered by insurance: 
“We didn’t build the walls to keep the water out so much as we built them to keep the 
insurance in” C28_M_4         
 
Plate 6.6: Cockermouth automatic flood barrier © H Deeming 2014 
 
Access to and the affordability of insurance was affected by the 2009 event, with reports of 
some flood-policy excesses being raised to unrealistic levels (e.g. £20,000: C51_M_4).  This 
was occurring at a time when the whole issue of flood insurance in England was being 
negotiated between the Government and the insurance industry (Defra, 2013c). Given the 
commercial interests in the town, this issue raised specific concerns about what any failure 
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to incorporate small businesses into any sort of subsidised insurance would have for towns 
like Cockermouth. With its high percentage of independent retailers bearing a high 
commercial vulnerability to flooding, this issue was very pertinent; a concern that was 
generally echoed by national trade federations (FSB, 2013): 
“So small businesses will be in a pickle because the trouble is, you need flood insurance 
because in a lot of cases, if you are raising money you’re using your stock as security and so 
obviously if you’re a bank lending on stock, you want to know that that stock is insured 
against all reasonable risks.  That’s the problem.” C06_M_4 
Notwithstanding this concern from a particular sector in the town, there were a number of 
good experiences with locally-based insurance agents.  However, there was always a 
concern that without a positive steer from government, this picture could change: 
“I’ve been making sure that my communications with [my insurers] at a more senior level have 
been maintained as I knew this was a problem.  But they could turn round at any time and 
say, ‘We’re not going to give you flood insurance, because we’re not required to anymore’.” 
C06_M_4  
In terms of household insurance, it is well understood that tenants represent a particularly 
vulnerable group, because they often cannot access or afford such protections (Burby et al., 
2003, Priest et al., 2005).  However, an interesting example of social welfare being reflected 
in a caring attitude toward tenants was evident in Cockermouth, and Keswick.  Local 
Housing Association tenants reported high levels of care being offered and effective 
recovery management being exhibited by their non-profit private-sector landlords.  This is a 
particularly interesting finding, because the actor with the greatest statutory responsibility for 
providing support for vulnerable households (of which some of those in social housing could 
be considered representative to some extent) is the Local Authority; a Category 1 responder.  
However, gradual change in the English social-housing sector has resulted in the vast 
majority of social housing in Cumbria now being supplied through these non-profit private-
sector organisations, rather than as a local authority service.  This well-regarded provision of 
service, therefore, illustrates another important aspect in relation to the private sector; that 
these organisations can learn.  Two of the major local housing associations had had 
properties flooded in 2005 and this had directly resulted in their development of 
sophisticated contingency plans for future flooding.  In terms of recovery this was particularly 
important, because this meant that when a number of their properties were inundated they 
were able to rapidly invoke the economies of scale in a way that private residents were not: 
“…because we are a big Housing Association, we work with [name] which is one of the 
biggest building contractors in Cumbria and we had an agreement with them, they used to do 
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all our building works.  […] they were able to do the same, more or less the same works, as 
the private lot, but for a far lot cheaper, as a unit cost.” C27_M_1 
This ability to work to a ‘unit price’ meant that housing association tenants tended to be out 
of their homes for a matter of 3 or 4 months, whereas the experience of private owner-
occupiers and business owners tended to be that they were out of their properties for 
significantly longer than this21.  Such a phenomenon, where at first glance social-housing 
tenants have fared better than home owners and others, has been previously observed 
(Whittle et al., 2010).  However, as in that situation this should not be considered as being 
straightforward.  For, whilst many owner occupiers went to considerable lengths to first 
negotiate and then incorporate ‘resilient measures’ into their properties’ restoration (e.g. 
concrete floors, raised electrics, waterproof ‘tanking’ of walls), the housing association 
buildings were all replaced on a like-for-like basis.   This meant restoration was expedited, 
but at least one Association was aware of the fact that in repairing like-for-like they were 
effectively reproducing exactly the same flood-vulnerable housing stock as they had before; 
i.e. they literally ‘bounced back’ to their pre-existing condition, rather than ‘bouncing forward’ 
(Manyena, 2011).  This conscious decision was acknowledged through the understanding 
that if any floods affect these properties again, then it will likely push them over the threshold 
to unsustainability:     
“I found a big folder of all the works, all the costs of works and again, like I said, we did it on 
the cheap, didn’t put in any flood resilience stuff at all, but there was a discussion being had 
that if it happened again, we would flatten and walk away and do something, we wouldn’t 
refurbish again, potentially.” C27_M_1 
However, it also meant that housing association staff became active within FAGs and the 
wider community of practice negotiations and invested considerable effort in promoting and 
supporting FRM schemes that would protect their vulnerable clientele, as well as their 
investment interests. 
As in Keswick, where the Soup Kitchen formed as a social hub of activity, so in Cockermouth 
where CTiC operated a refuge and information hub for the flood affected at Christ Church.  
This centre was staffed by church volunteers, but also served as a focal point through which 
local authority staff could coordinate their statutory duties of care (e.g. emergency housing 
provision).  Working from this facility also ensured that these staff were able to coordinate 
                                               
21 As no private tenants were interviewed, in this case we cannot be sure of the general recovery experience 
of that group 
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the effective delivery of support to vulnerable households by 3rd sector partners who carried 
a local authority care remit (Riding, 2012).  The volunteer activity coordinated by the local 
authority staff included the creation of a ‘Street Angels” group who carried out visits to flood 
affected areas in order to provide moral support and to identify vulnerable people in need:  
“It is questionable whether these households, not already engaged with third sector support 
organisations or referred to mainstream support services, would have been picked up without 
the ceaseless work of volunteers from organisations such as Churches Together, British Red 
Cross, Rotary and Lions.” Riding (2012: p.26) 
 The fact that other churches in the main street had been flood damaged, also meant that 
the churches’ supporting activities were conducted from here on a cross-denominational 
basis (as per the CTiC emergency plan: CTiC, 2013). 
Cockermouth: Summary 
Cockermouth experienced a flood of unprecedented magnitude, which 
inundated the commercial centre of the town as well as more exposed 
areas.  The fact that the heart of the town had been so badly damaged 
stimulated a powerful impetus to recover and reduce future risks.  That the 
socio-political characteristics of the network of local residents and 
institutions that drew together to coordinate this activism had failed to materialise so 
effectively following earlier floods in smaller parts of the town could, however, be regarded 
as an issue of division, wherein spectators to the earlier floods may have felt sorry for those 
affected, but not so sorry as to have felt compelled into action.  That the FAG was lead 
through this time by a resident who had seen her own home flooded three times in five years 
is testament to this individual’s tenacity, particularly given that the combined impact of 
flooding and ‘recovery gap’ pressures can create intolerable pressures.  As with Keswick, 
the focus of mitigation activity was on the building of physical structures, but there was 
always an understanding and fundamental trust that insurance would provide additional 
protection from residual risk.  This trust was well-founded for some in the town who reported 
satisfaction with local insurance agents.  However, for others concern is mounting that this 
financial-loss sharing mechanism will not always be available or that, already, it is 
unaffordable.  Again this issue raises the question as to whether the 2009 has brought this 
community, or at least some individuals within it, to a threshold of unsustainability.  Key 
learners in this town (and across Cumbria) were the private-sector housing associations, 
who had developed effective contingencies for supporting their vulnerable tenants.  Local 
authority staff added another layer of social protection, through a previously unanticipated 
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need to identify, support and provide for impacted residents and their facilitation and 
coordination of the 3rd sector activity.                  
6.3.3 Workington 
Workington is situated at the mouth of the River Derwent, where it flows into the Irish Sea.  
As such, this area was the last to be affected by the flood pulse as it flowed down the 
catchment.  Without doubt the most significant impact to manifest in the town was the 
collapse of Northside Bridge and the resultant death of Police Constable Bill Barker; the only 
fatality directly attributed to the event (Cumbria Resilience, 2011).   
The loss of this bridge and the damage to two others along this short river reach that led to 
their being condemned and closed, effectively sliced the town in two: 
“…if anybody had said ‘let’s have an emergency planning exercise the week before this 
happened and the scenario is that you lose 3 bridges in this town’, you’d have been laughed 
out the room and I’ve lived in and around Workington for most of my life and I couldn’t see 
that this was a place that was reliant on river crossings, like it was.” C38_F_1    
Almost overnight residents and businesses were faced with a one and a half hour detour, 
along a 14-18 mile round trip via Cockermouth, to get between parts of the town that sat 
facing on opposite sides of the river.  Straight away the situation put pressure on the delivery 
of public services, e.g. with the need to develop ways to simply get people to their doctor or 
to the hospital.  These challenges for road communication were to last for many months, 
although a temporary railway station was rapidly commissioned on the north side of the 
river22 and the building of the “Barker Crossing” bridge by the Army (opened by 8th 
December), provided important pedestrian-only links between the divided communities.  This 
considerable disruption affected residents‘ home and work lives, but the adaptations to their 
and to affected organisations‘ travel and transport routines were largely temporary and 
returned over a matter of weeks or months to pre-existing modes once the bridges reopened 
(Guiver, 2011).  Plate 6.7 shows the newly built award-winning Northside Bridge which 
opened in October 2012.   
The fact that the bridge failures garnered the highest levels of media, as well as local, 
attention at this end of the catchment should not, however, detract from the fact that 60-70 
dwellings were also directly affected by flooding.  
                                               
22
 The industrial-era railway bridge was the only local crossing robust enough to survive the flood 
without damage. 
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[There was a] lot of media attention on Northside and the community centre up there.  It’s an 
area of social housing, deprivation, a lot of focus, media attention on ‘Oh these poor people; 
these bridges washed away; they’ve got no access; they’re cut off’ and this sort.  And I can 
remember one person in particular saying to me ‘Why did they never turn the cameras round 
and look in the other direction to where we were, emptying houses, and throwing things 
away?’  They didn’t, they were focussed on the bridge, the infrastructure failure here.” 
C38_F_1  
 
Plate 6.7: Northside Bridge, Workington 
 
As there was no river-flood warning system in place for the town at that time (Environment 
Agency, 2010), these residents had received little or no formal warning of the approaching 
flood pulse before it arrived “like a tsunami” (C59_M_4).  
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The enormity of the infrastructure damage also meant that the formal agencies, by their own 
admission, did not really engage with the needs of those directly affected on the floodplain 
for several days after the event.  However, once these staff had developed a relationship 
with these households, these links of trust became central to these residents’ recovery from 
the trauma of the event and their negotiation of the ‘recovery gap‘: 
“P  …one property had a tree trunk in the middle of it.  This stuff had just come 
through with such force.  And it’s the little things you remember.  I can remember 
going down to that particular person, it was an old gentleman, whose wife had 
died and he was with his daughter and he’d had a box with the china dinner 
service in that had been a wedding present 50 odd years ago and it had just 
gone and he was focussed on that, because it was his wife’s pride and joy. And 
it’s those kind of things that, we probably really didn’t get plugged into that; we 
were so busy running around doing the practicalities. 
Q You needed a professional to actually be able to talk him through that? 
P Yeah, yeah but by the time we could offer that, they didn’t want to talk to 
anybody else anymore; they wanted to talk to us, because we were there.”  
C38_F_1  
Such pressure placed on the staff of responding agencies was not unusual along the 
catchment.  Contingency planning had simply not been done for an event of this magnitude 
or for the recovery from it, and over several days staff were regularly left to autonomously 
develop innovative solutions to problems they were faced with; not least the Police, who lost 
their local-communications capability when the recently built Public-Private Initiative (PFI) 
funded Police station was flooded: 
“…it was a genuine disaster to wake up and see your area on Sky news and think ‘why have I 
not heard anything?’ That’s because there’s no radio signals: the whole thing had gone down. 
To think that the police can’t get hold of the police is an absolute, you know, and it literally 
was down to, it was kind of like a third world scenario, you know what do you do?  So I got my 
pick-up truck and just drove to Maryport police station” C63_M_1 
Once the flood had abated, recovery planning got underway, but where Flood Action Groups 
had formed a central focus in the other towns – providing a hub through which the authorities 
could engage with community needs – in Workington the situation was different.  With such 
a small number of affected properties, relative to the large size of the town, the FAG 
attracted little support from the rest of the community:   
“So in Cockermouth and Keswick, where there were people who were involved with the 
groups, because it was about the community, and they weren’t flooded, they still had an input.  
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A lot of the people who were involved in Workington and drew that forward to start with, sort 
of burnt out a bit because by the time they’d been flooded and had to put all their houses back 
together, and they were doing this as well and there wasn’t really anybody behind them, who 
didn’t have all that other baggage to push it forward.  And that’s been difficult for them in that 
the wider community haven’t come aboard with them.”  C38_F_1 
So whilst individuals took a strong lead guiding the recovery and mitigation process in the 
other towns, they did so there from the position of strength that was provided by wider 
community support.  Whereas in Workington, without this support, the efforts of the 
individuals, falling as they did alongside their own recovery stresses and ‘recovery-gap‘ 
related re-traumatisations (Whittle et al, 2010), could become unsustainable on a personal 
level: 
P  “…what happened was, in February, no because I still took time off then, so by 
summer 2011 I’d given up. 
Q Just so frustrated? 
P Yeah, and when they started about me like making an Emergency Plan to cover 
pandemic flu, you name it, and I thought, ‘hang on a minute, you’re getting paid to do 
this’.” C57_F_4  
The challenge for the formal agencies was also in trying to enable this community to become 
more self-reliant and capable in terms of managing their own flood risks, when the 
individuals involved were not able to ‘buy-into’ the idea: 
“[We’ve had] workshop days effectively on resilience planning and to be honest I still haven’t 
got my head round it; I still don’t understand what they are asking us to do.”  C27_M_3-3 
These issues raise challenges for the organisations that wish to engage communities in 
deliberations over their sustainability and resilience.  The evidence suggests that factors 
such as psychological pressure, frustration and physical and/or emotional exhaustion can 
mean that those individuals who emerge as key links between the community and the 
agencies are not necessarily able to engage with deterministic bureaucracies or to 
participate effectively through the whole course of the protracted negotiations that often 
exemplify such processes.  Whilst building trust with communities is a key aspiration, for 
example, for the Environment Agency (Environment Agency, 2007), the fact is that trust in 
this context is more aligned with ideas of dependency than with feelings of mutuality 
(Szerszynski, 1999, Wynne, 1996), i.e. the flooded residents of Workington trusted – i.e. 
depended on – the authorities to protect them, but then felt let down.  First when their homes 
were inundated with little warning and secondly when it became clear that there was no 
realistic chance that major investment would be made to protect their homes from future 
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extreme events (i.e. the focus of the emergency planning process was – as in rural areas – 
more focussed on what residents would do in terms of preparedness/response, rather than 
on enabling of facilitating grass-roots advocacy for mitigation).   
Workington: Summary 
In terms of resources and capacities the central element of the Workington experience was 
the damage caused to the place-based infrastructure.  The unanticipated failure of the 
town’s bridges cleaved the town in two and placed enormous strain on a local authority that 
bore statutory responsibilities for service delivery in a community that comprised the highest 
concentration of deprived households in the catchment.  The experience of the majority, 
however, masked the fact that a relatively small number of households had also suffered 
devastating physical impacts.  These people were faced with the twin issues of disruption of 
normal road communications and also the recovery-gap negotiations.  Some individuals 
have been engaged with the Cumbria Resilience drive to encourage community emergency 
planning.  However, with only a tiny proportion of the town’s population physically exposed to 
flooding this engagement has lacked the dynamic wider buy-in that the other towns FAGs 
have utilised so effectively in developing innovative structural defence solutions.  The fact 
that the flood defence cost-benefit ratio will never favour significant expenditure on 
protecting so few households, set in such an exposed location, means that planning is 
effectively limited to defining the triggers for evacuation.  The bridges have reopened and the 
rest of the town’s population have returned to normal, whereas the resilience of these few 
depends to a greater extent on simply hoping that the flood will never happen again: 
“…we wonder, is it going to get us this time?  And then you get to a point you think ‘ah, it’s 
never going to happen.  It won’t do.  Look it hasn’t happened tonight.  Look, we didn’t put the 
flood gates up; we didn’t get flooded’.” C56_F_4 
6.4 Community Resilience: Summary 
 
The county wide flood event of November 2009 impacted the Derwent 
catchment in Cumbria in multiple ways.  Farmers were left deprived of their 
most productive land and village dwellers found themselves dealing with 
flood effects largely on their own.  Simultaneously, town dwellers and small 
businesses suffered devastating damage to their homes and livelihoods as 
river levels overwhelmed built defences and inundated some commercial and residential 
areas to depths in excess of 2m.  The majority of those affected have, however, maintained 
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or recovered a degree of functionality that could suggest this event was experienced by a 
population bearing high levels of resilience.   
The natural-hazard governance context was shifting in Cumbria prior to this event.  An 
earlier wide-area flood in 2005 had already exposed many in the county to high-
consequence flood effects (Carroll et al., 2006, Cumbria County, 2005, Environment Agency, 
2006) and the social learning  this experience had precipitated was already leading to close 
collaborations between the previously hazard affected and still exposed population and the 
risk-managing authorities .   After the January 2005 event, a number of Flood Action Groups 
(FAGs) had already started to develop effective response measures in close collaboration 
with the emergency services. 
Such endeavours easily fit under the UK Cabinet Office (2011) definition of community 
resilience, with its focus on response capacity and communities’ ability to work 
collaboratively with the formal responding agencies during an event (see section 4.3.1).  
However, what could be clearly seen during the research was a wider community 
engagement that went beyond simply preparing for and responding to a hazard event.  A 
strong-advocacy centred mode of social-networking led campaigning was also evident.  
Whether it was reflected in the FAGs persistence in developing various location-specific 
emergency plans and advocating for various structural and non-structural risk mitigation 
measures, or in local-commerce focussed organisations intent on returning their businesses 
to profitability, or in partnerships of land-owners and managers working to ensure their land 
remained as productive as possible, the role of social networks engaging in the process of 
risk-mitigation was clearly evident.  From the perspective of the emBRACE framework, it 
was clear that resilience, in terms of the communities’ capacity to achieve effective actions 
(Preparedness, Response, Recovery, Mitigation) is well evidenced, within a complex and 
largely complementary mix of approaches to flood risk mitigation, even if those actions are 
more effective for some than for others.   
Taking a Sustainable Livelihoods Approach (SLA) this case study can also identify that a full 
range of resources and capacities were mobilised by the flood-affected population, with 
different resources being vital in the development of action-based responses that reduced 
the risk of disaster.  Whether such disaster threatened at the scale of a household or a 
community, the ‘resourcefulness’ exhibited by many community members, as well as people 
in governance positions, illustrated an admirable capacity for civil protection, but also 
concern over more the time-extended well-being (i.e. social protection) of this population; as 
was evidenced by the local authority staff’s coordination of the 3rd Sector activities during 
recovery period.  
67 
 
Whilst a range of management techniques and technologies have been deployed, principal 
amongst all measures adopted by town residents was the focus on the protective role of 
concrete, metal and glass as components of structural defence measures.   This focus on 
hazard management (i.e. rather than risk management), has been critiqued since White 
wrote is seminal thesis on the human adjustment to floods hazards in the mid twentieth 
century (White, 1945).  However, it appears that the legacy of place-based and other 
resources that are situated along this (and probably many other catchments in Europe) are 
of such value (financial, economic, cultural, even ontological: see Harries, 2008) that there is 
little public appetite for doing anything other than defending the built environment largely as 
is. 
In the next section the key attributes that were identified to have an impact on the respective 
‘geographical communities’ are assessed relative to the three domains of the emBRACE 
framework; potential indicators are then proposed.           
 
7. Tabulation of key themes emerging from cross 
geographical-community investigation and 
identification of central indicators for assessing 
community resilience  
This section comprises tables derived from a comparative analysis of the key resilience 
factors that emerged from this interview-based study.  The five case-study geographical 
‘communities’ are entered as columns, with cross tabulation carried out across rows defining 
the domains of the emBRACE framework, primarily under an appropriate SLA resource or 
capacity set (see, table 4.1, section 5.2).  They are then sub categorised under the 
appropriate Action stage (i.e. Preparedness actions such as flood warning is demonstrably 
different from Recovery actions such as purchasing insurance or dealing with a loss 
adjuster).  Finally, where appropriate they are sub-categorised under Learning. 
The final column contains numbers that relate to the relevant ‘indicator’ that has been 
proposed as potentially offering the capacity to directly measure a key aspect of that factor 
or a proxy for it.  A list of selected attributes of the proposed indicators can be found at the 
end of the report (Appx 4). 
NB. Both this original SLA_Table and the UoN Proposed Indicator Excel sheet are archived 
on the North of England case-study page project website www.embrace-eu.org  
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Resource / 
Capacity 
Action Learning 
Rural: Farming Rural: Other Keswick Cockermouth Workington 
Proposed 
Indicator 
N
a
tu
ra
l 
/ 
P
la
c
e
-b
a
s
e
d
 
N/A   
Legacy of land-use 
and land-
management 
practices (e.g. 
pasture)  predicate 
specific vulnerability 
to flood events  
Small numbers of 
people exposed to 
fluvial / pluvial flood 
risks across range 
of contexts (e.g. 
isolated, village)    
Position at 
confluence of rivers 
means high risk of 
repeat flooding 
Position at confluence 
of rivers means high 
risk of repeat flooding 
Topography means 
that few are directly 
exposed to high-
magnitude flood 
hazard, but event 
illustrated wider 
systemic vulnerablity 
to infrastructure 
damage. 
1,2 
P
re
p
ar
e
d
n
e
ss
 
Communications 
infrastructure 
resilience is a key 
element in rural 
preparedness 
Communications 
infrastructure 
resilience is a key 
element in rural 
preparedness 
      3, 4, 5 
Le
ar
n
in
g 
Innovative 
communications 
methods may be 
required to provide 
sufficient lead time in 
rural communities 
with poor IT 
infrastructure 
Innovative 
communications 
methods may be 
required to provide 
sufficient lead time 
in rural 
communities with 
poor IT 
infrastructure 
    
Innovative 
communications 
methods may be 
required to provide 
sufficient lead time in 
isolated communities 
with poor IT 
infrastructure 
5, 23, 25, 
27, 28  
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R
e
co
ve
ry
 
  
    
Key role identified for 
social-networking 
facilities during 
recovery (i.e. soup 
kitchen) 
Key role identified for 
social-networking 
facilities during 
recovery (i.e. Christ 
Church) 
  7 
M
it
ig
a
ti
o
n
 
Potential conflicts 
remain over policy 
shift toward re-
naturalising 
watercourses and 
the sustainability of 
hill-farming 
Isolated and village 
dwellings remain 
exposed to residual 
risks from high-
magnitude flood 
events 
Residual risks remain 
which continue to 
expose areas of town 
to the effects of high-
magnitude flood 
events 
Residual risks remain 
which continue to 
expose areas of town 
to the effects of high-
magnitude flood events 
Residual risks remain 
which continue to 
expose areas of town 
to the effects of high-
magnitude flood 
events 
1,2 
  
        
Bridge repair has 
reduced likelihood of 
repeat of transport 
disruption, but 
illustrates the need 
for infrastructure to be 
designed to 
incorporate low-
probability, high-
consequence hazard 
effects 
3,4 
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Bridge repair has 
reduced likelihood of 
repeat of transport 
disruption, but 
illustrates the need 
for infrastructure to be 
designed to 
incorporate low-
probability, high-
consequence hazard 
effects 
3, 4  
  
Le
ar
n
in
g 
        
Need identified to 
develop 
contingencies for 
'worst-case' 
infrastructure failure 
and disruption 
12 
Resource / 
Capacity 
Action Learning 
Rural: Farming Rural: Other Keswick Cockermouth Workington 
Proposed 
Indicator 
S
o
c
io
-
P
o
li
ti
c
a
l 
P
re
p
a
re
d
n
e
s
s
 
L
e
a
rn
in
g
 
An effective early 
warning is a 
fundamental civil-
protection 
requirement 
An effective early 
warning is a 
fundamental civil-
protection 
requirement 
An effective early 
warning is a 
fundamental civil-
protection 
requirement 
An effective early 
warning is a 
fundamental civil-
protection requirement 
An effective early 
warning is a 
fundamental civil-
protection 
requirement 
23, 25 
71 
 
  
The presence of an 
effective 
emergency 
planning/action 
group provides a 
key link between 
communities and 
civil/social 
protection 
practitioners 
The presence of an 
effective emergency 
planning/action group 
provides a key link 
between 
communities and 
civil/social protection 
practitioners 
The presence of an 
effective emergency 
planning/action group 
provides a key link 
between communities 
and civil/social 
protection practitioners 
The presence of an 
effective emergency 
planning/action group 
provides a key link 
between communities 
and civil/social 
protection 
practitioners 
19,20 
Resource-intensive 
communications 
methods may be 
required to provide 
sufficient lead time in 
isolated and 
vulnerable 
communities 
Resource-intensive 
communications 
methods may be 
required to provide 
sufficient lead time 
in isolated and 
vulnerable 
communities 
Resource-intensive 
communications 
methods may be 
required to provide 
sufficient lead time in 
isolated and 
vulnerable 
communities 
Resource-intensive 
communications 
methods may be 
required to provide 
sufficient lead time in 
isolated and vulnerable 
communities 
Resource-intensive 
communications 
methods may be 
required to provide 
sufficient lead time in 
isolated and 
vulnerable 
communities 
24 
R
e
s
p
o
n
s
e
 
  
Farming community 
holds resources and 
capacities to assist 
community during 
events (self-help) 
Safety-related 
protocols for flood 
warden activities 
evolving in 
communities with 
CEP 
Clear safety-related 
protocols for flood 
warden activities 
during response 
Clear safety-related 
protocols for flood 
warden activities during 
response 
Evolving safety-
related protocols for 
flood warden 
activities during 
response 
21, 27,  
  
For effective 
response, rural 
community CEP 
groups need to be 
fully integrated into 
formal response 
(linked call-out 
protocols) 
      24 
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Planned, 
community-based 
flood response is 
likely to be most 
effective if it utilises 
people whose 
homes are not at 
direct risk from 
hazard  
Planned, community-
based flood response 
is likely to be most 
effective if it utilises 
people whose homes 
are not at direct risk 
from hazard  
Planned, community-
based flood response is 
likely to be most 
effective if it utilises 
people whose homes 
are not at direct risk 
from hazard  
Planned, community-
based flood response 
is likely to be most 
effective if it utilises 
people whose homes 
are not at direct risk 
from hazard  
17,20 
R
e
c
o
v
e
ry
 
L
e
a
rn
in
g
 
Community of 
Practice should 
integrate key 
elements of civil 
protection 
(prep/response) and 
long-term social 
protection 
(recovery/mitigation) 
Community of 
Practice should 
integrate key 
elements of civil 
protection 
(prep/response) 
and long-term 
social protection 
(recovery/mitigation
) 
Community of 
Practice should 
integrate key 
elements of civil 
protection 
(prep/response) and 
long-term social 
protection 
(recovery/mitigation) 
Community of Practice 
should integrate key 
elements of civil 
protection 
(prep/response) and 
long-term social 
protection 
(recovery/mitigation) 
Community of 
Practice should 
integrate key 
elements of civil 
protection 
(prep/response) and 
long-term social 
protection 
(recovery/mitigation) 
9, 10, 19 
  
Cultural differences 
between 'off-
comers' and 
farmers can result 
in constraints on 
adaptive potential 
(e.g. difficulty in 
getting farmers to 
consider catchment 
scale FRM 
measures to reduce 
risks downstream, 
because their land 
is more valuable to 
them without) 
    
Key long-term 
recovery/welfare 
coordination role for 
statutory-authority 
staff 
10,  
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Local farming 
interests acted as 
key driver of 
outcome delivery 
(where it had been 
absent previously).  
Growth promoters 
regarded recovery 
as 'an opportunity' 
    
Local business 
interests acted as key 
driver of outcome 
delivery (where it had 
been absent 
previously).  Growth 
promoters regarded 
recovery as 'an 
opportunity' 
  14, 22 
    
IEM approached 
holistically: made 
possible due to dual-
nature of FAG 
membership 
(response/advocacy) 
    19 
Affected 
communities should 
be directly 
represented in 
strategic recovery-
coordination groups 
in order to avoid the 
risk of 'doing 
recovery to these 
people not with 
them' 
Affected 
communities should 
be directly 
represented in 
strategic recovery-
coordination groups 
in order to avoid the 
risk of 'doing 
recovery to these 
people not with 
them' 
Affected communities 
should be directly 
represented in 
strategic recovery-
coordination groups 
in order to avoid the 
risk of 'doing 
recovery to these 
people not with them' 
Affected communities 
should be directly 
represented in strategic 
recovery-coordination 
groups in order to avoid 
the risk of 'doing 
recovery to these 
people not with them' 
Affected communities 
should be directly 
represented in 
strategic recovery-
coordination groups 
in order to avoid the 
risk of 'doing recovery 
to these people not 
with them' 
28 
74 
 
Key 
welfare/guidance 
role for agricultural 
coordinator 
  
Key long-term 
recovery/welfare 
coordination role 
identified for 
statutory-authority 
staff 
Key long-term 
recovery/welfare 
coordination role 
identified for statutory-
authority staff 
Key long-term 
recovery/welfare 
coordination role 
identified for 
statutory-authority 
staff 
35, 36, 37 
    
The 3rd Sector can 
provide a key role in 
delivering support 
during recovery (e.g. 
Soup Kitchen) 
The 3rd Sector can 
provide a key role in 
delivering support 
during recovery (e.g. 
Flood Angels) 
  11 
M
it
ig
a
ti
o
n
 
  
Farming community 
can be isolated and 
exclusive, but key 
individuals and 
facilitators have 
illustrated potential 
to negotiate rural 
FRM outcomes 
Various community-
scale planning 
forums have shown 
themselves useful 
in developing risk-
management 
outcomes  
FAG highly politically 
engaged and 
influential in 
determining FRM 
outcomes.  
FAG highly politically 
engaged and influential 
in determining FRM 
outcomes.  
FAG (predominantly 
flood affected 
membership) limited 
in ability to engage 
influential support 
from community.   
17, 18, 22, 
25, 28 
75 
 
Cultural differences 
between 'off-comers' 
and farmers can 
result in lack of 
adaptive potential 
(e.g. difficulty in 
getting farmers to 
consider catchment 
scale FRM 
measures to reduce 
risks downstream, 
because their land is 
more valuable to 
them without) 
Cultural differences 
between 'off-
comers' and 
farmers can result 
in lack of adaptive 
potential (e.g. 
difficulty in getting 
farmers to consider 
catchment scale 
FRM measures to 
reduce risks 
downstream, 
because their land 
is more valuable to 
them without) 
Community of 
Practice integrates 
key elements of civil 
protection 
(preparedness/respo
nse) and long-term 
social protection 
(recovery/mitigation) 
Community of Practice 
integrates key elements 
of civil protection 
(preparedness/respons
e) and long-term social 
protection 
(recovery/mitigation) 
Community-based 
CEP largely focussed 
on response-related 
planning, 
8, 9, 10 
L
e
a
rn
in
g
 
10-Step CEP 
promoted throughout 
community of 
practice offers 
opportunity for 
communities to 
engage in 
developing 
contingencies for all-
risks (not just FRM)  
10-Step CEP 
promoted 
throughout 
community of 
practice offers 
opportunity for 
communities to 
engage in 
developing 
contingencies for 
all-hazards and 
risks (not just FRM)  
10-Step CEP 
promoted throughout 
community of 
practice offers 
opportunity for 
communities to 
engage in developing 
contingencies for all-
hazards and risks 
(not just FRM)  
10-Step CEP promoted 
throughout community 
of practice offers 
opportunity for 
communities to engage 
in developing 
contingencies for all-
hazards and risks (not 
just FRM)  
10-Step CEP 
promoted throughout 
community of practice 
offers opportunity for 
communities to 
engage in developing 
contingencies for all-
hazards and risks 
(not just FRM)  
12, 13, 14, 
15, 16, 17, 
19,  35,36,  
76 
 
Innovative 
participatory 
processes have led 
to local FRM 
outcomes, but at the 
expense of some 
conflict between 
national policy and 
local agri-business 
sustainability 
        9, 10, 22 
      
Need identified to 
develop contingencies 
for 'worst-case' hazard 
effects on local 
businesses 
Need identified to 
develop 
contingencies for 
'worst-case' hazard 
effects on local 
businesses 
8, 9 
Effective FRM 
requires long-term 
engagement by 
trained staff in order 
to build trust with 
communities.  This 
includes candid 
approaches to 
expectation 
management  
Effective FRM 
requires long-term 
engagement by 
trained staff in 
order to build trust 
with communities.  
This includes 
candid approaches 
to expectation 
management  
Effective FRM 
requires long-term 
engagement by 
trained staff in order 
to build trust with 
communities.  This 
includes candid 
approaches to 
expectation 
management  
Effective FRM requires 
long-term engagement 
by trained staff in order 
to build trust with 
communities.  This 
includes candid 
approaches to 
expectation 
management  
Effective FRM 
requires long-term 
engagement by 
trained staff in order 
to build trust with 
communities.  This 
includes candid 
approaches to 
expectation 
management  
29, 30, 31, 
32, 33, 34, 
36 
77 
 
Catchment scale 
processes affect 
different 
communities in 
different ways, 
therefore, 
catchment-scale 
FRM-deliberation 
processes require 
cross-community 
participation 
Catchment scale 
processes affect 
different 
communities in 
different ways, 
therefore, 
catchment-scale 
FRM-deliberation 
processes require 
cross-community 
participation 
Catchment scale 
processes affect 
different communities 
in different ways, 
therefore, catchment-
scale FRM-
deliberation 
processes require 
cross-community 
participation 
Catchment scale 
processes affect 
different communities in 
different ways, 
therefore, catchment-
scale FRM-deliberation 
processes require 
cross-community 
participation 
Catchment scale 
processes affect 
different communities 
in different ways, 
therefore, catchment-
scale FRM-
deliberation 
processes require 
cross-community 
participation 
10 
Resource / 
Capacity 
Action Learning 
Rural: Farming Rural: Other Keswick Cockermouth Workington 
Proposed 
Indicator 
H
u
m
a
n
 
P
re
p
a
re
d
n
e
s
s
 
L
e
a
rn
in
g
 
Farming community 
has illustrated 
adaptive potential in 
face of multiple 
chronic livelihood 
threats (e.g. 
diversification). Key 
individuals are 
engaged with FRM, 
with this regarded as 
positive advocacy for 
cultural values  
      
Individuals' 
engagement with 
long-term FRM 
marked by frustration 
at failure to deliver 
major scheme 
32, 33, 34 
CEP can elicit 
effective responses 
from engaged 
community members 
CEP can elicit 
effective responses 
from engaged 
community 
members 
CEP can elicit 
effective responses 
from engaged 
community members 
CEP can elicit effective 
responses from 
engaged community 
members 
CEP can elicit 
effective responses 
from engaged 
community members 
17 
78 
 
R
e
s
p
o
n
s
e
 
  
Regardless of 
presence of CEP 
spontaneous 
responders will 
emerge and can be 
effective in reducing 
impacts but their 
activities can 
increase their 
individual and social 
risks 
Regardless of 
presence of CEP 
spontaneous 
responders will 
emerge and can be 
effective in 
reducing impacts 
but their activities 
can increase their 
individual and 
social risks 
  
Regardless of presence 
of CEP spontaneous 
responders will emerge 
and can be effective in 
reducing impacts but 
their activities can 
increase their individual 
and social risks 
Regardless of 
presence of CEP 
spontaneous 
responders will 
emerge and can be 
effective in reducing 
impacts but their 
activities can increase 
their individual and 
social risks 
18, 24, 38  
R
e
c
o
v
e
ry
 
  
    
Flood and resultant 
recovery process can 
inflict psychological 
stress on anyone, 
including key 
community 
'champions' 
Flood and resultant 
recovery process can 
inflict psychological 
stress on anyone, 
including key 
community 'champions' 
Flood and resultant 
recovery process can 
inflict psychological 
stress on anyone, 
including key 
community 
'champions' 
11, 35, 36 
M
it
ig
a
ti
o
n
 
L
e
a
rn
in
g
 
    
Mature, community-
based FRM driven by 
key individuals with 
persistence and 
sophisticated 
understanding of 
physical/hydrological 
challenges and FRM 
bureaucracies .  
Mature, community-
based FRM driven by 
key individuals with 
persistence and 
sophisticated 
understanding of 
physical/hydrological 
challenges and FRM 
bureaucracies .  
Agency-driven CEP 
process adopted by 
flood-exposed 
individuals 
17, 19, 20 
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Key natives and 
‘off-comers’ can be 
particularly 
‘resourceful’ in 
terms of protecting 
interests.  
Persistence 
regarded as 
required personal 
trait 
Repeated flood 
experience leads to 
greater engagement 
in FRM 
Repeated flood 
experience leads to 
greater engagement in 
FRM 
Prevalence of 
probabilistic risk 
perception in hazard 
exposed  
6, 17, 18, 19, 
20 
Resource / 
Capacity 
Action Learning 
Rural: Farming Rural: Other Keswick Cockermouth Workington 
Proposed 
Indicator 
F
in
a
n
c
ia
l 
R
e
c
o
v
e
ry
 
  
Agri-environmental 
schemes (e.g. HLS) 
are of principle 
importance in 
defining farmers' 
FRM activity 
        45 
  
Access to 
insurance key in 
enabling physical 
recovery 
Access to insurance 
key in enabling 
physical recovery 
Access to insurance 
key in enabling physical 
recovery 
Access to insurance 
key in enabling 
physical recovery 
41 
Lack of access to 
insurance for key 
agricultural outputs 
increases 
vulnerability and 
reliance on flexible 
agri-grant schemes 
        45 
80 
 
    
Recovery-gap' issues 
obvious in the 
challenges faced by 
homeowners in 
restoring their 
properties (e.g. with 
negotiations with 
insurers, loss-
adjusters and 
builders) 
Recovery-gap' issues 
obvious in the 
challenges faced by 
homeowners in 
restoring their 
properties (e.g. with 
negotiations with 
insurers, loss-adjusters 
and builders) 
Recovery-gap' issues 
obvious in the 
challenges faced by 
homeowners in 
restoring their 
properties (e.g. with 
negotiations with 
insurers, loss-
adjusters and 
builders) 
11,35 
Means-tested 
charitable grants 
awarded to some 
farmers  
Means-tested 
charitable grants 
awarded to some 
residents  
Means-tested 
charitable grants 
awarded to some 
residents  
Means-tested 
charitable grants 
awarded to some 
residents  
Means-tested 
charitable grants 
awarded to some 
residents  
43, 44 
M
it
ig
a
ti
o
n
 
Gravel management 
dependent on 
consenting process 
and at direct cost to 
land-owner 
        36, 45 
  
Cost:benefit criteria 
mean little realistic 
chance of major 
scheme, so 
exposed 
community limited 
to PLP measures 
Defra-funded major 
Fluvial scheme, but 
other measures (e.g. 
pumps) funded 
through Community 
of Practice fund 
raising and FAG 
advocacy  
FAG, CCoT acted as 
key facilitators in 
drawing funding for 
structural measures, 
including supporting the 
balot for raising funds 
through council-tax 
precept 
  36, 42, 43 
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Major infrastructure 
restored through 
national budgets and 
as insured loss 
42 
  
Recovery assisted 
by presence of 
central charitable 
institution (e.g. 
donation towards 
PLP) 
Recovery assisted by 
presence of central 
charitable institution 
(e.g. donation 
towards scheme) 
Recovery assisted by 
presence of central 
charitable institution 
(e.g. donation towards 
scheme) 
Recovery assisted by 
presence of central 
charitable institution 
(e.g. donation 
towards PLP) 
42, 43, 44 
L
e
a
rn
in
g
 
  
Innovative 
participatory 
processes have led 
to local Civil 
Protection 
outcomes, but FRM 
outcomes still 
constrained by 
cost:benefit limits 
and lack of 
evidence for 
efficacy of 
catchment-scale 
measures  
  
Pragmatic 
understanding that 
scheme "not to keep 
water out, but to keep 
insurance in"  
Community-sourced 
charitable grants 
regarded as 
insufficient to cover 
cost of effective PLP 
in vulnerable 
properties 
36, 42, 43, 
44 
    
 
 
Housing associations 
implemented lessons 
learned during 2005 
event to improve 
recovery experience 
of tenants 
 
 
 
 
Housing associations 
implemented lessons 
learned during 2005 
event to improve 
recovery experience of 
tenants 
 
 
  16 
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Resource / 
Capacity 
Action Learning Rural: Farming Rural: Other Keswick Cockermouth Workington 
Proposed 
Indicator 
P
h
y
s
ic
a
l 
P
re
p
a
re
d
n
e
s
s
 
  
Communications 
infrastructure 
resilience is a key 
element in rural 
preparedness 
Communications 
infrastructure 
resilience is a key 
element in rural 
preparedness 
      3, 4, 5 
L
e
a
rn
in
g
 
Innovative 
communications 
methods may be 
required to provide 
sufficient lead time in 
rural communities 
with poor IT 
infrastructure 
Innovative 
communications 
methods may be 
required to provide 
sufficient lead time 
in rural 
communities with 
poor IT 
infrastructure 
      
5, 23, 25, 
27, 28  
R
e
c
o
v
e
ry
 
  
    
Key need identified 
for community-based 
social-networking 
facilities during 
recovery (i.e. soup 
kitchen) 
Key need identified for 
community-based 
social-networking 
facilities during 
recovery (i.e. Christ 
Church) 
  7 
M
it
ig
a
ti
o
n
 
  
  
Mitigation confined 
to smaller scale 
projects as major 
structural schemes 
would not meet 
cost:benefit critieria 
Major structural 
scheme cited as key 
element in town's 
recovery 
Major structural 
scheme cited as key 
element in town's 
recovery 
Mitigation confined to 
smaller scale projects 
as major structural 
schemes would not 
meet cost:benefit 
critieria 
40 
83 
 
  
        
Bridge repair has 
reduced likelihood of 
repeat of transport 
disruption, but 
illustrates the need 
for infrastructure to be 
designed to 
incorporate low-
probability, high-
consequence hazard 
effects 
3, 4  
L
e
a
rn
in
g
 
        
Need identified to 
develop 
contingencies for 
'worst-case' 
infrastructure failure 
and disruption 
12 
 
 
 
 
84 
 
 
 
8. Conclusion:  ‘Community Resilience’ at the 
Catchment Scale: Balancing Civil and Social 
Protection Needs and Priorities 
Investigating ‘community’ resilience to natural hazards along a short river catchment 
presents problems of quantification and qualification.  The very question “which 
community are we talking about?” revealed there to be any number of population 
groups who could be categorised as bearing an interest.  Flood impacts along the 
course of the catchment varied.  The inundation of fertile pasture meant that farmers 
in the high catchment saw their, already multiply-stressed, businesses placed under 
further strain, whilst townspeople and businesses further downstream also 
experienced devastating damage to their homes, livelihoods and psychological 
security. 
That the population affected by the 2009 flood has visibly ‘recovered’ can, to a large 
extent, be attributed to the hard work of individuals as well as groups and networks 
operating through a range of institutions at a number of scales.  Individual ‘Floodees’ 
have laboured to return their own properties to functionality.  The Flood Action 
Groups have worked closely with the formal agencies in ‘Communities of Resilience 
Practice’ (CoRP), which have grown and developed through processes of social 
learning. They have done this in ways that have built both their own capacities to 
respond to a future event, but also enabled and encouraged them to advocate – 
often vociferously – for mitigation measures to be developed to protect them.  The 
personnel and staff of the civil protection agencies and statutory and 3rd sector social 
protection practitioners have been stretched, during a period of concurrent financial 
austerity, to assist their communities to get back to ‘normal’. Part of this assistance 
has required them to encourage and/or to compel communities to take responsibility 
for their own resilience. 
The aims of the case-study were: 
1. To identify the resource and capacity sets required by a community to 
build resilience toward flood events and the capabilities required to 
mobilise these resources. 
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2. To assess how social factors such as trust, accountability, cooperation, 
power and influence interact to influence the mobilisation of resources. 
3. To devise indicators of community resilience that encompass the resource 
sets, action phases (mitigation, etc.) and social learning dimensions that 
are at the heart of the emBRACE general framework 
 
In respect to the first aim, the research confirmed the complex mix of resource and 
capacity sets that comprise the core of community disaster resilience. While civil 
protection dimensions remain key facilitators, they cannot effect fully resilient 
outcomes unless developed in concert with the broader social protection objectives 
and alongside a cohort of engaged community members. The varying outcomes for 
Keswick and Cockermouth on one hand and Workington on the other go some way 
to evidence the need for an effective ‘Community of Resilience Practice’. 
The complexity of the relationships between resources/capacities, actions and 
learning was evident, as the lens passed down the catchment from the Fells to the 
sea and perfectly illustrated the difficulty in compartmentalising ‘Community 
Resilience’ as any simple, uniform component of a population’s makeup: the even 
greater complexity of the cross-context indicator sets is a demonstration of this. 
Some key attributes did emerge, however.  For example, the social network maps in 
Box 6.1, (p.46), illustrate very effectively the complex lateral bonding and bridging 
nature of key individuals’ social networks at community level, but they also reveal 
how effective these people are at linking hierarchically (often on first-name terms) 
into power relationships.  The potential role of people like this in facilitating concerted 
community engagement with risk mitigation and resilience building should not be 
underestimated or devalued.  However, it should not be forgotten that this 
engagement can also come at considerable personal cost to them, especially if these 
individuals have been directly flood affected themselves.  Furthermore, if so much of 
a community’s resilience is based on one or a small number of individuals does this 
not also point to a vulnerability, or at least a lack of redundancy, at its heart that the 
presence of strong, accountable, institutional services and support (‘social protection’ 
broadly understood) should go some way to alleviate? 
In relation to the second aim, to build trust in FRM bureaucratic processes and civil 
protection procedures within a catchment, which inevitably encompasses a range of 
communities with varying access to resources and capacities, requires a dynamic 
appreciation of balance and social equity.  Without this there is a risk that isolated 
and vulnerable communities will be left to spectate as those with louder voices, 
greater savvy and more political linkage receive more investment (e.g. financial, 
emotional, temporal), simply because they are more able to manipulate the ‘rules of 
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the game’ in their own favour.  Such challenges lie at the heart of the social equity 
concerns that underpin the Sustainable Livelihoods Approach.   
In essence, however, the process that could be said to have underpinned community 
resilience across the social scales and catchment features investigated, revealed 
itself to be contextually complex and rich in its capacity – either latent or pre-existing 
– to expand, extend or to emerge (Dynes, 2005b) within any number of social, or 
community situations.  Key factors in determining how resilient the households, 
businesses and communities were relative to each other, included, as already 
summarised, the presence and engagement of ‘resourceful’ individuals (within the 
community itself or as enablers working within community-facing organisations), but 
also place-based factors such as the availability of a formal warning systems and 
loss-sharing mechanisms.  The importance of understanding any community’s 
capacity and willingness to trust in authority appeared to be a key attribute.   
Austerity and the intense competition for the financial resources in Defra’s FRM 
budget provided a backdrop against which many smaller communities were being 
encouraged to do what they could for themselves.  Even large physical schemes 
needed a community contribution, but in Cockermouth such a scheme came to 
fruition.  This was achieved through the collaborative efforts of the town’s FAG the 
local authority and other flood-management agencies.  The fact that physical defence 
structures formed such a focus of attention cannot, however, be ignored from a 
resilience perspective.  This is because we should all be cognisant of the conclusive 
critique in the literature regarding the tendency of structural measures to increase 
rather than to reduce flood risk (Brown and Damery, 2002, Parker, 1995, White et al., 
2001).  In terms of resilience in the Derwent catchment, however, it was the presence 
or lack of engineered solutions that went furthest toward underpinning people’s 
psychological ability to manage the risks to which they remain exposed: 
“I don’t know at which point you get to that … point of saying ‘actually we have bent out of 
shape so much that there is no more elasticity; we have to change things’.  And that’s not 
the same as returning to a normality.  What we’re talking about is there is fundamental 
transformation and I don’t think we’re there yet with flooding in Cumbria, because it’s 
easier to build, to do the King Canute thing of trying to hold things back, rather than move 
great chunks of [our towns].” C47_M_1 
What these investigations revealed quite clearly was that resilience, as it is defined 
by the IPCC (2014) is powerfully represented along this catchment.  It has, however, 
been won over a period of years through the experience of repeat (flood) events.  It 
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has also been won at higher cost to those directly impacted by those events than to 
those who have not been.  There is clear evidence of the capacity exhibited by the 
catchment’s social, economic, and environmental systems to cope with a high 
magnitude flood event as well as with other disturbances.  They have also responded 
to and reorganised themselves in ways that maintain their essential function, identity, 
and structure and they have adapted and learned, while also perhaps maintaining a 
capacity for transformation23 that may only truly be operationalised once some future 
tipping point is crossed.  Whether the next high-magnitude flood to strike pushes one 
or more of the communities studied here over that remaining threshold remains 
difficult to assess.   
This report has corroborated the understanding that, even in the close spatial 
confines of a short river catchment, different geographical communities need to 
access and utilise different resource sets and capacities to maintain their resilience to 
hazards.  However, it has also identified that engaged Communities of Resilience 
Practice (CoRP) offer significant potential in working collaboratively toward disaster-
risk reduction outcomes at these catchment scales.  A challenge is also offered, 
however, in the way that CoRP’s have been identified as requiring a truly inclusive 
remit.  This involves formal agencies understanding and supporting each other’s 
roles, in deliberating and delivering a full range of capacity-building civil- and social-
protection solutions that reflect sustainable, equitable and achievable outcomes at 
every point along the Integrated Emergency Management spectrum (i.e. not just 
preparedness and response) and for all communities they serve.     
In completion of the final aim, the set of qualitatively-determined indicators proposed 
in this report offers Communities of Resilience Practice potentially useful metrics with 
which to measure the resilience of their hazard-exposed population over time, but 
also a means through which to illustrate to each other the complex range of 
community attributes that they each, and therefore by association, they all need to 
nurture if their risk reduction mandate is to be achieved. 
 
 
                                               
23
 Transformation: “The altering of fundamental attributes of a system (including value-
systems; regulatory, legislative or bureaucratic regimes; financial institutions; and 
technological or biological systems) emBRACE Glossary (2012) 
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Appendix 1:   
emBRACE interviews Cumbria: topic guide 
About you 
Name, role, how long lived/worked in [town/area/Cumbria]? 
‘Community’ 
How would you describe [town/area] in terms of it being ‘a community’? 
If other people in [town/area ] talk about the local ‘community’ who do you think they are 
referring to?  
Resilience 
What is your understanding of the word resilience and how it relates to flood risk 
management in [town/area/Cumbria]? 
What do you think are the characteristics of a flood resilient community? 
The flood event 
Our research is primarily focused on understanding how the population of [town/area] thinks 
about and responds to flood threats, therefore: 
… can you please give an account of your experience of flooding and how it has 
affected you? 
In terms of returning to ‘normal’ life after the flood, how quickly do you think this was 
achieved… 
… by you? 
… by the population of [town/area]? 
How useful were the aid and services provided in [town/area] following the flood/s?  
What do you think were the good and not so good things done to support those 
affected?   
Were there people or groups who were particularly vulnerable during the flood? 
Did they receive effective support? 
How was this coordinated? 
Could you please explain what you think was the hardest part of getting back to 
‘normal’ after the flood/s? 
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For you personally? 
For [town/area]? 
What do you think could be done to improve the time that it takes to get back to ‘normal’ 
after a flood (what resources would be most useful for) … 
individuals/households? 
[town/area] as a whole? 
What are the lessons that have been learned following the 2009 and other floods? 
What have you learned, personally? 
What has the [town/area] community learned? 
Who do you think learned the most?  
How has this learning been illustrated? 
Do you feel that good decisions are being made with regards to reducing the threat of 
flooding by local leaders and authorities? 
Examples? 
As time passes, do you think that local resilience to flooding will improve, stay at today’s 
levels, or tail off? 
What factors do you think will influence this (e.g. institutional memory)? 
What was the state of community flood resilience in [town/area] prior to the flood 
event/s? 
+ on a scale of 1-10 
In your opinion, how did the state of community resilience in [town] change as a result of the 
flood event/s? 
+ on a scale of 1-10   
In relation to the idea of community flood resilience, who have been the most influential in 
developing this locally … 
individuals 
networks (social; in/formal governance; private sector)  
What have they achieved and how has this been enabled?  
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In combination, or separate from the hazard event(s) themselves, have any policy 
changes, social changes and/or environmental changes affected the local 
resilience-building process; for better or worse? 
Thinking more widely, how do you think the community resilience in [town/area] compares 
to that in other locations along the Derwent Catchment (i.e. from the High Fells to 
Workington)? 
Thinking about all the characteristics of a flood resilient community that we have discussed, 
can you think of anything that might help us to measure resilience (e.g. internet access or 
the number of households exposed to flood hazards)? 
“The third (voluntary and community) sector needs to work to develop a stronger 
presence in strategic planning for community recovery at a County Level.” (Riding, 
2010: p11) 
Has this happened?  What gateways and barriers identified? 
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Appendix 2:  
Interview Analysis: codes and themes 
 Name – Code title 
 Sources – number of interview transcripts referenced 
 References – total number of references  
Name   Sources References 
3RD SECTOR   26 79 
Constraints on 3rd sector provisioning   33 116 
Emergent behaviour   29 63 
ADAPTIVE CAPACITY   36 131 
Adaptive capacity - Constraints on   37 200 
Adaptive Capacity - Gender   3 4 
Diversification - Agri-Practice   15 110 
Financial - Farm Payments   13 69 
Diversification - Tourism   7 13 
Transition   9 28 
COMMUNITY   2 3 
Communities of circumstance   32 118 
Communities of geography   28 58 
Communities of Identity   28 79 
Culture - Farming Practice   20 132 
CULTURE - Tradition   14 30 
Communities of interest - practice   29 116 
Communities of support   27 117 
Community - diversity-disparity   25 73 
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Children   7 8 
Elderly   13 15 
Families with babies and school-age children   2 2 
Gender   4 5 
Middle-aged   0 0 
Young People   6 12 
Community - Intra-community conflict   17 50 
Off-comers   12 22 
Second home owners   5 9 
Conflicts - community vs community   31 112 
Exclusive communities   16 32 
Rural-Urban divide   18 59 
DISASTERS LOOP   2 2 
CIVIL PROTECTION   4 6 
Integrated Emergency Management (IEM)   35 148 
Mitigation   31 54 
Preparedness   33 98 
Reconstruction   15 27 
Recovery   25 70 
Response   32 102 
INDICATORS   10 26 
LEARNING LOOP   2 4 
Historical Events   39 134 
Frequency   20 39 
Individual learning   30 92 
Social-Institutional Learning 
 
53 395 
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MEDIA   17 28 
RESILIENCE   3 4 
Community Resilience   42 158 
GOOD PRACTICE   24 74 
Rapidity   15 40 
Redundancy   13 26 
Resilience Agenda - as institutionalised approach 
 
20 53 
Resilience characteristics   25 139 
Resourcefulness   30 83 
Robustness-Resistance   23 51 
RESOURCES LOOP   3 3 
Financial Capital   30 128 
Insurance   26 70 
Human   6 9 
Human - Psychological effects   30 84 
Concatenation of events   20 40 
Secondary effects - Re-traumatisation   24 52 
Human - Risk Perception   38 107 
Human - Skills   32 92 
Local Knowledge   35 135 
Natural   1 1 
Natural - Biodiversity   12 46 
Natural - Gravel   22 108 
Natural - Sustainability   24 168 
Natural-Place-Based   34 245 
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Physical   4 5 
Communications   19 36 
Infrastructure   28 62 
Structural Measures   28 71 
'P'olitical   3 6 
Advocacy   21 41 
Governance - Austerity   21 35 
Governance - Constriants   35 186 
Governance - Financial   22 90 
Governance - FRM   46 271 
FAG - Advocacy   13 51 
FAG - Advocacy-Activism   10 41 
FAG - Response   18 50 
Governance - Legacy   20 52 
Governance - Participative 
 
39 179 
Governance - Private Sector   17 34 
Governance - Sustainability   23 101 
Knowledge Management   36 109 
Political - Governance   28 69 
Trust in Authority   35 113 
Whole Catchment Planning   25 108 
Social Capital   9 31 
Key Boundary actors - objects   32 190 
SocCap - Bonding   18 45 
SocCap - Bridging   19 58 
104 
 
SocCap - Linking ('p'olitical capital)   19 57 
SocCap - Reciprocity   6 12 
SocCap - Trust   20 45 
Social Capital - FRM   36 151 
Social Capital - Rural   14 30 
Sustainability - Social factors   15 44 
SOCIAL PROTECTION   3 4 
Social Protection - Community Engagement   26 54 
Social Protection - Grants   14 51 
Social Protection - Vulnerability assessment   24 64 
THRESHOLDS   29 81 
VULNERABILITY   8 32 
Children   4 7 
Physical - vulnerability   23 73 
Social - vulnerability   17 45 
Systemic - vulnerability   13 23 
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Appendix 3: Sample SNM analysis data 
 
Interviewee Interviewee code Location Organisation Sector URN Gender Specific Location General Location Organisation / Institution Organisation Sector Purpose 1 Purpose 2 Purpose 3 Actions
Quality of 
Contact
Quantity 
of Contact
Reciprocity
C04 C04-1_M_3-3_Hil Hilltown FAGs 2_Hill Hilltown Local Governance - District scale Governance (inc. blue lights)Collaborative working (hazard related) Response 1 3 2
C04 C04-1_M_3-3_Hil Hilltown FAGs C15_F_3-3_Hil F Hilltown Local 3rd Sect - FAG FAGs FAG - advocacy FAG - response Collaborative working (hazard related)Response 1 3 2
C04 C04-1_M_3-3_Hil Hilltown FAGs C75_M_2_Hill M Hilltown Local Governance - District scale Governance (inc. blue lights)FAG - advocacy Collaborative working (hazard related) Response 1 3 2
C04 C04-1_M_3-3_Hil Hilltown FAGs C13_M_1C M Hilltown Local Emergency Services (inc. Mountain rescue)Governance (inc. blue lights)FAG - advocacy Collaborative working (hazard related) Response 1 3 2
C04 C04-1_M_3-3_Hil Hilltown FAGs C49_F_1A F County County Environment Agency Environment FAG - advocacy Collaborative working (hazard related) Response 1 3 2
C04 C04-1_M_3-3_Hil Hilltown FAGs 1C County County Emergency Services (inc. Mountain rescue) Collaborative working (hazard related) Response 1 3 1
C04 C04-1_M_3-3_Hil Hilltown FAGs 3-1_M_Lions M County County 3rd Sect - National/County Community Providing financial assistance Collaborative working (hazard related) Recovery 1 3 1
C04 C04-1_M_3-3_Hil Hilltown FAGs 4_Hill Hilltown Local Community' member Community Providing financial assistance Recovery 1 2 1
C04 C04-1_M_3-3_Hil Hilltown FAGs 3-1_Rotary_M_own.vill M Own village Local 3rd Sect - National/County Community Providing financial assistance Recovery 1 1 1
C04 C04-1_M_3-3_Hil Hilltown FAGs C76_M_3-1_Hill M Hilltown Local Governance - Nat/County scaleGovernance (inc. blue lights)Collaborative working (hazard related) Recovery 1 3 2
C04 C04-1_M_3-3_Hil Hilltown FAGs C77_M_5_Utilities M National National Private Sector Building/Infrastructure Collaborative working (hazard related) Recovery 1 3 2
C04 C04-1_M_3-3_Hil Hilltown FAGs C78_F_1A F County County Environment Agency Environment Providing hazard information Collaborative working (hazard related) Recovery 1 2 2
C04 C04-1_M_3-3_Hil Hilltown FAGs C79_M_1_Hill M Hilltown Local Governance - Nat/County scaleGovernance (inc. blue lights)Professional contact (other) Recovery 1 1 2
C04 C04-1_M_3-3_Hil Hilltown FAGs 3-4_soupkitchen_Hill Hilltown Local Faith-based Community Providing emotional support Collaborative working (hazard related) Recovery 1 3 1
C04 C04-1_M_3-3_Hil Hilltown FAGs C80_F_1B F County County Governance - Nat/County scaleGovernance (inc. blue lights)Complaint about service Collaborative working (hazard related) Recovery 1 3 2
C04 C04-1_M_3-3_Hil Hilltown FAGs C81_F_3-1_RedCross F National National 3rd Sect - National/County Community Collaborative working (hazard related) Recovery 2 2 2
C04 C04-1_M_3-3_Hil Hilltown FAGs 1C_Police_M_Hill M Hilltown Local Emergency Services (inc. Mountain rescue)Governance (inc. blue lights)Collaborative working (hazard related) Response 1 3 1
C04 C04-1_M_3-3_Hil Hilltown FAGs 1_Royal_M M National National Governance - Nat/County scaleGovernance (inc. blue lights)Providing emotional support Recovery 1 1 1
C04 C04-1_M_3-3_Hil Hilltown FAGs 1_TV_F F National National Governance - Nat/County scaleGovernance (inc. blue lights)Providing emotional support Recovery 1 1 1
C04 C04-1_M_3-3_Hil Hilltown FAGs C61_M_1C_Army M County County Governance - Nat/County scaleGovernance (inc. blue lights)Collaborative working (hazard related) Response 1 2 2
C04 C04-1_M_3-3_Hil Hilltown FAGs C82_M_1A M National National Environment Agency Environment Professional contact (FRM) Collaborative working (hazard related) Mitigation 1 3 2
C04 C04-1_M_3-3_Hil Hilltown FAGs 3-1_CCF County County Governance - Nat/County scaleGovernance (inc. blue lights)Providing financial assistance Recovery 1 2 2
C15 C15_F_3-3_Hil Hilltown FAGs C92_M_4A_Hill M Hilltown Local Neighbour Community Providing Physical Support (FRM) Response 1 2 2
C15 C15_F_3-3_Hil Hilltown FAGs C49_F_1A F County County Environment Agency Environment Providing hazard information Preparation 1 1 2
C15 C15_F_3-3_Hil Hilltown FAGs C76_M_3-1_Hill M County County Governance - Nat/County scaleGovernance (inc. blue lights)Collaborative working (hazard related) Preparation 2 1 2
C15 C15_F_3-3_Hil Hilltown FAGs C50_M_1A M County County Environment Agency Environment Providing hazard information Collaborative working (hazard related) Preparation 1 1 2
C15 C15_F_3-3_Hil Hilltown FAGs C93_M_1 M National National Governance - Nat/County scaleGovernance (inc. blue lights)Providing hazard information Recovery 1 1 1
C15 C15_F_3-3_Hil Hilltown FAGs C94_M_3-3_Hill M Hilltown Local Governance - District scale Governance (inc. blue lights)FAG - advocacy FAG - response Collaborative working (hazard related)Recovery 1 3 2
C15 C15_F_3-3_Hil Hilltown FAGs C04-1_M_3-3_Hil M Hilltown Local 3rd Sect - FAG FAGs FAG - response Collaborative working (hazard related) Preparation 1 2 2
C15 C15_F_3-3_Hil Hilltown FAGs 2_Clerk_F_Hill F Hilltown Local Governance - District scale Governance (inc. blue lights)Collaborative working (hazard related) Preparation 1 1 1
C15 C15_F_3-3_Hil Hilltown FAGs 2_Councillor_M_Hill M Hilltown Local Governance - District scale Governance (inc. blue lights)FAG - response Collaborative working (hazard related) Response 1 3 2
C15 C15_F_3-3_Hil Hilltown FAGs 5_consultants National National Private Sector Environment Providing hazard information Mitigation 1 1 1
C15 C15_F_3-3_Hil Hilltown FAGs 1A National National Environment Agency Environment Providing hazard information Mitigation 2 2 2
C15 C15_F_3-3_Hil Hilltown FAGs 2_councils Own village County Governance - District scale Governance (inc. blue lights)Providing financial assistance Mitigation 2 2 1
C15 C15_F_3-3_Hil Hilltown FAGs 5_hotel_Hill Hilltown Local Private Sector Community Providing Physical Support (FRM) Recovery 1 2 1
C15 C15_F_3-3_Hil Hilltown FAGs 4A_Hill Hilltown Local Neighbour Community Seeking emotional support Seeking Physical support (FRM) Recovery 1 2 2
C15 C15_F_3-3_Hil Hilltown FAGs 2_Mayor_Hill M Hilltown Local Governance - District scale Governance (inc. blue lights)Providing hazard information Recovery 2 1 1
C15 C15_F_3-3_Hil Hilltown FAGs 2_M_GP_Hill M Hilltown Local Governance - District scale Governance (inc. blue lights)Providing emotional support Recovery 1 1 1
C15 C15_F_3-3_Hil Hilltown FAGs 5_builders_Hill Hilltown Local Private Sector Building/Infrastructure Providing Physical Support (FRM) Recovery 1 1 1
C15 C15_F_3-3_Hil Hilltown FAGs 5_builders National National Private Sector Building/Infrastructure Providing Physical Support (FRM) Recovery 2 2 2
C15 C15_F_3-3_Hil Hilltown FAGs 5_business_Hill Hilltown Local Private Sector Community Providing financial assistance Recovery 2 2 2
C15 C15_F_3-3_Hil Hilltown FAGs C04-2_F_3-3_Hil F Hilltown Local Community' member Community Providing emotional support Recovery 1 2 2
C15 C15_F_3-3_Hil Hilltown FAGs C18-1_F_3-3_Hil F Hilltown Local Community' member Community Providing emotional support Recovery 1 2 2
C15 C15_F_3-3_Hil Hilltown FAGs C18-2_M_3-3_Hil M Hilltown Local 3rd Sect - FAG FAGs Providing emotional support Recovery 1 2 2
C15 C15_F_3-3_Hil Hilltown FAGs C95_F_4_Hill F Hilltown Local Community' member Community Providing emotional support Recovery 1 2 2
C15 C15_F_3-3_Hil Hilltown FAGs C96_M_4A_Hill M Hilltown Local Neighbour Community Seeking Physical support (FRM) Response 1 2 2
C15 C15_F_3-3_Hil Hilltown FAGs C97_F_4A_Hill F Hilltown Local Neighbour Community Providing Physical Support (FRM) Response 1 2 2
C15 C15_F_3-3_Hil Hilltown FAGs C98_M_4A_Hill M Hilltown Local Family member Community Providing emotional support Providing Physical Support (FRM) Response 1 2 2
C15 C15_F_3-3_Hil Hilltown FAGs C99_M_5_surveyor M County County Private Sector Building/Infrastructure Providing hazard information Recovery 1 2 2
C15 C15_F_3-3_Hil Hilltown FAGs C100_F_4A_Hill F Hilltown Local Neighbour Community Providing hazard information Recovery 1 2 2
C15 C15_F_3-3_Hil Hilltown FAGs C101_M_4A_Hill M Hilltown Local Neighbour Community Providing Physical Support (FRM) Mitigation 1 2 2
C15 C15_F_3-3_Hil Hilltown FAGs C102_M_4A_Hill M Hilltown Local Neighbour Community Providing Physical Support (FRM) Mitigation 1 2 2
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Appendix 4: 
Proposed Indicator-Set (key attributes): Community Resilience (UoN)  
 
Indicator 1   Indicator 2 
Description of 
evaluation 
Short naming  Number Detail Detail 
Hazard Exposure - built 
environment 
1 Flood-zone occupation 
% of hazard-exposed residential 
buildings as percentage of all 
residential buildings  
Hazard Exposure - built 
environment 
2 Flood-zone commerce 
% of hazard-exposed retail and 
commercial buildings as 
percentage of all retail and 
commercial buildings  
Networked Critical 
Infrastructure* (CI) exposed 
3 
CI in hazard zones (no. as % of all 
CI in type, e.g. primary road miles, 
water treatment facilities) 
% of key infrastructure lying within 
hazard zones (by domain)  
CI: Transport Route 
redundancy  
4 
Redundancy in transportation 
routeing (i.e. short-distance 
alternatives) 
Alternative primary routes into 
community (1 route = 0 
redundancy) 
Communications - Broadband 5 
% population with access to >2MB 
Broadband connectivity 
% households in at-risk areas 
connected to >2MB broadband.  
Analysis through address-point 
resolution and hazard outline GIS 
layers 
Previous Hazard Experience 6 
Geographical Community's prior 
experience with hazard 
Research-derived evidence that 
Geographical Community has been 
exposed to previous hazard events 
Pre-identified rest-centres / 
social-support facilities 
7 
Community-identified rest and/or 
support centre 
Identification of community-
appropriate buildings to be used for 
rest and social support during and 
after event (e.g. a 'Soup kitchen') - 
with redundancy 
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Risk Assessment 8 
Structured (top down) risk 
assessment  
Civil Protection practitioners / 
responders should have developed 
a community scale risk register 
Risk Assessment 9 
Existence of participatory risk 
assessment process 
Do civil-protection practitioners and 
local residents/community 
members share a forum through 
which to assess and plan for local 
risks? 
Whole Catchment Planning 10 
Existence of whole-catchment 
flood-risk management planning 
process/forum 
Presence of cross-sector FRM 
planning process/forum at 
catchment scale 
3rd Sector coordination 11 
Presence of 3rd sector emergency 
coordination body 
Interviews with 3rd sector 
stakeholders 
Business BCM plan - 
Networked Critical 
Infrastructure* (CI) exposed - 
contingency plan 
12 
Existence of contingency plans for 
dealing with impacts on CI in 
hazard zones 
Existence of integrated and 
validated CI BCM plans by sector 
(Transport, Communications, 
Water, Energy) 
Business BCM plan - Business 
community 
13 
No. of local businesses with 
Business Continuity Mge. (BCM) 
plan 
Survey-derived: No. of companies 
with BCM plans as % of all SMEs 
within location 
Business BCM plan - Business 
institutions 
14 
Chamber of Commerce with BCM 
workstream 
Key-stakeholder interview derived: 
presence of BCM plan Y/N 
Business BCM plan - 
Community Services 
15 
Community services with BCM 
workstream (e.g. surgeries, 
pharmacies, etc.) 
Survey-derived: No of local service 
delivery centres in location with 
BCM plan as % of all deliverers 
Business BCM plan - Housing 
providers 
16 
Public and Private sector Social-
Housing providers have 
emergency BCM plan related to 
provision for affected tenants  
Key-stakeholder interview derived: 
presence of BCM plan Y/N 
Community Emergency Plan 
(CEP) 
17 
Exposed community has an 
adopted/tested Community 
Emergency Plan (CEP) 
A resilient community will have a 
CEP in place  
Community Emergency plan - 
Household 
18 
Household emergency plans 
(HEP) in exposed area 
High % of HEPs = resilient, Low = 
less resilient 
108 
 
Hazard Action Group - 19 Existence of committee-led HAG 
Is there a HAG operating in the 
geographical/hazard area? 
Hazard Action Group - 
composition 
20 
Membership split between hazard 
exposed and unexposed 
Membership of HAG does not 
consist solely of people whose 
residence is within delineated 
hazard zones 
Community response - IEM 
integration  
21 
Community Emergency Response 
linked to agency response 
Community representation in multi-
agency response 
Community planning 22 
Presence of formally-constituted 
community-based planning group 
(e.g. Neighbourhood Planning) 
Number of formally constituted 
participatory and/or democratically 
elected planning groups in the 
location (e.g. Parish Council) 
Non-Structural 23 
Early-warning system (EWS) in 
exposed area 
Is there a Total Flood Warnng 
System in place for at-risk 
communities? (Parker, 2003 - see 
comment)  
Warning & Informing - 
Community response - IEM 
integration  
24 
Community Emergency Response 
linked to agency Integrated 
Emergency Management (IEM) 
response 
Presence of CEP/Warden 
activation/call-out protocols in 
control room SoPs/Plans                                                             
Warning & Informing - 
Households 
25 Households registered to EWS 
% of exposed community 
supported by an IT-based early-
warning system for which they 
receive membership notifications 
and updates?  
Warning & Informing - 
Location-based SMS alerting 
26 
Existence of strategy and 
protocols for location-based or 
cell-broadcasting of warning 
messages and risk information 
(eg. via SMS) 
Protocols for cell broadcasting in 
at-risk area (e.g. Police control 
room SoPs,  LA emergency plans) 
Warning & Informing - Social 
Media 
27 
Existence of strategy and 
protocols for broadcasting warning 
messages and risk information via 
social media (e.g. Community 
Messaging) 
Protocols for use of social-media 
based EWS and risk information by 
civil protection staff 
Strategic Recovery Group 28 
Strategy and protocols in place for 
community representation on 
strategic-level recovery-
management group (e.g. LA, town 
Strategy and protocols detailed in 
emergency plans 
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or municipal council) 
Community Cohesion 29 
Hazard-exposed communities 
possess high levels of community 
cohesion 
Social cohesivness is a factor in 
defining levels of social capital 
Social Capital - Networks 30 
Hazard-exposed communities 
possess high levels of social 
capital (bonding, bridging, linking) 
Social networks provide structures 
for the generation of social capital 
Social Capital - Social Trust 31 
High levels of social trust, as 
measured by standard survey 
questions 
Social trust is a factor that 
underpins social capital 
Social Norms - Trust in 
Authority 
32 High levels of trust in authority 
Trust in Authority is a factor in 
defining how individuals engage 
with formal agencies/organisations 
Social Norms - Sense of 
belonging 
33 
High levels of sense of belonging 
in 'community' 
High levels of sense of belonging 
would indicate stronger sense of 
community 
Social Norms - Place 
Attachment 
34 High levels of place attachment 
High levels of place attachment 
could indicate strong incentivisation 
to mitigate impacts or restore 
functions impacted 
        
Human Resources - Staff 
training programmes 
35 
Business Continuity: Presence of 
cross-departmental Local 
Authority/Municipality staff training 
programmes, which impart 
knowledge and skills to staff that 
can be used in emergencies 
Is there a Local Authority intra-
departmental Civil Protection 
Training Programme that supports 
staff roles in Preparedness, 
Response, Recovery and 
Mitigation activities? 
Human Resources - 
Engagement Specialists 
36 
Presence of staff trained / 
employed by key agencies to 
explicitly engage communities in 
hazard-related issues and 
contingency planning 
Do IEM agencies and 
organisations employ staff to 
engage communities with 
emergency planning at the local 
scale? 
Human Resources - Role 
description 
37 
Details of Social/Civil Protection 
role during emergencies included 
in Local Authority Social-
Protection/Social Welfare related 
Local Authority Social-Protection 
Departments employee role 
profiles examined for emergency-
role related clauses 
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role profiles 
Human Resources - Wardens - 
system/protocols 
38 
IEM plans include accedited 
training protocols for Hazard-
Warden based warning and 
informing system (i.e. door-
knocking) 
Does an accredited hazard-warden 
scheme, which is integrated into 
the Total hazard-warning system, 
exist in the location  
        
Structural 39 Property-Level Protection (PLP) 
PLP measures fitted (no. buildings) 
as % of all hazard exposed 
buildings 
Structural 40 community level protection 
% of flood-hazard exposed 
properties protected by structural 
measures  
        
Non-Structural 41 Loss-sharing - Insurance 
Loss-sharing: Insurance - % of 
hazard-exposed properties that are 
insurable to a sector-acceptable 
risk level at 'affordable' premium 
cost 
Non-Structural 42 Loss-sharing - Government 
Loss-Sharing: Relief (Govt/LA) Is 
there a formal process in place 
through which locally-affected 
communities can draw on Govt 
support? 
Flexible grant/compensation 
system 
43 Loss-Sharing - Grants 
Loss-Sharing: Relief (Charity 
sector): Availability of a flexible 
community grant system that can 
pay out for disruption-related loss 
Grant-funding organisation 44 Loss-sharing - 3rd sector Org 
Presence of County/Municipality-
Level Community Funding 
Organisation, capable of collecting 
donations and distributing 
emergency and mitigation-related 
grants  
Flexible grant/compensation 
system 
45 Flexible Agricultural Grants 
Agri-grant scheme funding which 
can be redeployed to enable 
recovery activities 
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Flexible grant/compensation 
system 
46 
Diversity of financial resources attributed to 
community-capacity building 
Range of resource streams from 
which community-capacity building 
grants and programmes are 
funded 
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Appendix 5: 
Maps 
1) Workington (Flood outline) 
2) Cockermouth (Flood Outline) 
3) Keswick (Flood outline) 
4) Braithwaite 
5) Lorton Vale 
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Workington 
 
 
 
 
 
 
This illustration contains mapping data licenced from Ordnance Survey @ Crown 
Copyright and Database Right 2009 and Environment Agency data replicated under 
licence @ PROTECT-NTH6563H 
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Cockermouth 
 
 
 
 
 
This illustration contains mapping data licenced from Ordnance Survey @ Crown 
Copyright and Database Right 2009 and Environment Agency data replicated under 
licence @ PROTECT-NTH6563H 
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Keswick 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
This illustration contains mapping data licenced from Ordnance Survey @ Crown 
Copyright and Database Right 2009 and Environment Agency data replicated 
under licence @ PROTECT-NTH6563H 
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Braithwaite (no flood outline available) 
 
 
 
 
 
  
© Crown Copyright and Database Right December 2014. Ordnance Survey (Digimap 
Licence): 
117 
 
Lorton Vale and the River Cocker (no flood outline available): Low Lorton circled 
 
© Crown Copyright and Database Right December 2014. Ordnance Survey (Digimap 
Licence): 
118 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
This study has been funded by the  
European Commission on the 7
th
 Framework Programme 
 
 
Centre for Research on the Epidemiology of Disasters (CRED)  
Catholic University of Louvain School of Public Health 
30.94 Clos Chapelle-aux-Champs 
1200 Brussels, Belgium 
T: +32 (0)2 7643327 
F: +32 (0)2 7643441 
E: info@cred.be 
W: http://www.cred.be 
 
 
Northumbria University 
School of the Built and Natural Environment,  
 Newcastle upon Tyne  
NE1 8ST,  
UK 
T: + 44 (0)191 232 6002 
W: www.northumbria.ac.uk 
 
